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INTRODUCTION
A growing number of states have enacted statutes authoriz-
ing limited liability companies.1 These unique entities combine
the corporate benefit of limited liability with the federal tax ad-
1 See ALA. CODE § 10-12-1 to -61 (1993); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-601 to -857
(Supp. 1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-32-106 (Supp. 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-
101 to -913 (West Supp. 1993); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-101 to -1106 (1993); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 608.401 to -.471 (West Supp. 1994); GA. CODE ANN. § 14-11-100 to -1109
(Harrison Supp. 1993); IDAHO CODE § 53-601 to -672 (1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 805,
arts. 1-60 (1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 23-16-10.1-1 to -4 (Burns 1992); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 490A.100 to .1601 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7601 to -7651 (1992);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1301 to :1369 (West 1994); MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & Ass'NS
§ 4A-101 to -1103 (1993); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. (Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322 B.01 to -.960 (West 1994); Miss. CODE ANN. § 79-29-101 (1994); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 347.010 to -.735 (Vernon 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-8-101 to -1307 (1993); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 1-112 to -168 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 86.010 to .571 (Michie 1994);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304-C:1 to :85 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 42:2B-1 (West 1994);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 53-19-1 to -74 (Michie 1993); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 57C-1-01 to 10-07
(1993); N.D. CENT. CODE § 10-32-01 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2000-2060
(West Supp. 1994); OR. REV. STAT. § 63.001 (1993); R.I. GEN. LAws § 7-16-1 to 75
(1993); S.D. CODIFIED LAWs ANN. § 47-34-1 to -59 (1993); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
art. 1528n (West Supp. 1994); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-101 to -157 (1994); 1994 Vt.
Laws 167; VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1000 to -1073 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE § 31-IA-I to
-69 (Supp. 1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-102 to -143 (Supp. 1994). Additional statutes
are either pending or have recently been enacted in Alaska, California, Connecticut,
District of Columbia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, New York, Ohio,
Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Tennessee, Washington, and Wisconsin.
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vantage of treatment as a partnership,2 prompting commentators
to observe that "the development and tax recognition of limited
liability companies promises to change the law of business as-
sociations radically."3
2 See Susan P. Hamill, The Limited Liability Company: A Possible Choice for Do-
ing Business?, 41 U. FLA. L. REv. 721 (1989) (providing overview of limited liability
company, critical tax features, and business situations in which use of limited liability
company is attractive); Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and
the Death of Partnership, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 417-38 (1992) (focusing on relative
advantages and disadvantages of partnership form and advantages of limited liability
company); see also infra note 5.
3 Joseph A. Rodriguez, Comment, Wyoming Limited Liability Companies: Lim-
ited Liability and Taxation Concerns in Other Jurisdictions, 27 LAND & WATER L.
REV. 539, 545-46 (1992) (analyzing Wyoming Limited Liability Company Act and its
hybrid nature); see Louis A. Mezzullo, Limited Liability Companies: A New Business
Form?, TAx!'N FOR LAw., Mar.-Apr. 1993, at 296 (providing overview of hybrid nature
of limited liability companies and analysis of tax considerations); Brian L. Schorr,
Limited Liability Companies: Features and Uses, C.P.A. J., Dec. 1992, at 26 (provid-
ing excellent overview of flexibility offered by limited liability companies seeking to
combine beneficial tax status and flexibility of partnership along with limited liabil-
ity of corporate structure); see also Ribstein, supra note 2, at 475.
[I]n the long run limited liability might come to be regarded as the residual
business form, with individual liability reserved for firms that make special
filings. This could result not only from the wider acceptance of limited liabil-
ity, but also from the reduced attractiveness to creditors of individual liabil-
ity because of procedural barriers and exhaustion requirements that focus
liability on the firm rather than on the individual partners.
Id. The development of moder limited liability company statutes is traced in Rodri-
guez, supra, at 544-45.
The modern establishment of limited liability company statutes began in
Alaska during the early 1970's. A Texas based oil company, wishing to con-
duct business in oil rich Alaska, sought to have a statute enacted that would
enable it to conduct its business with less expenses and fewer restrictions
.... The principal purpose for enactment of the act was to provide an addi-
tional source of revenue to Alaska through filing fees and annual taxes.
Id. at 544 (footnotes omitted). The Alaska statute was not passed because of uncer-
tainty regarding the federal tax treatment of the limited liability company: Id. While
taxation as a partnership was desirable, it was not clear whether a limited liability
company would be taxed as a partnership or a corporation. Id. A private letter ruling
from the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") could not be obtained before the Alaska
legislature voted, and the Alaska bill was defeated. Id. Subsequently, in 1977, Wyo-
ming enacted a limited liability company statute despite the fact that issues concern-
ing taxation remained unsettled. Id. at 544-45. In 1982, Florida enacted a limited
liability company statute. Id. at 546. Colorado and Kansas followed in 1990. Id. In
1988, the questions concerning the taxation of limited liability companies were
largely resolved. Id. at 557. "[Tihe I[nternal] R[evenue] S[ervice] issued Revenue Rul-
ing 88-76, [1988-2 C.B. 361] which stated that a Wyoming L[imited] L[iabiityl
C[ompany], none of whose members or designated managers were personally liable
for any debts of the company, was to be classified as a partnership for federal income
tax purposes." Id. at 558. In an effort to distinguish between a corporation and a
partnership, the I.R.S. focused on the following factors: "1) [the] continuity of life, 2)
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Limited liability companies are owned by "members" rather
than "shareholders" or "partners."4 They are typically privately-
centralization of management, 3) liability for corporate debts limited to corporate
property, and 4) free transferability of interests." Id. Applying the principles enunci-
ated in Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976) and Revenue Ruling 88-76, the
IRS determined that if the entity possessed more corporate characteristics than
noncorporate characteristics (i.e. if it possesses three or more of such characteristics),
the entity would be taxed as a corporation rather than as a partnership. Id. at 558-59.
In Revenue Ruling 88-76, the I.R.S. "found that [a] Wyoming L[imited] L[iabiity]
C[ompany] lacked the corporate characteristic of continuity of life" since the limited
liability company is "dissolved upon the death, retirement, resignation, expulsion,
bankruptcy, or any other termination of a membership," unless the business is contin-
ued by the consent of all the remaining members. Id. at 558. Further, the Wyoming
limited liability company lacked the corporate characteristic of free transferability of
interest. Id. A member's interest may be transferred only with the consent of all re-
maining members. Id. Thus, the failure to possess more corporate than noncorporate
features resulted in classification as a partnership for tax purposes. Id. at 559. For a
discussion of the tax treatment of limited liability companies, see Mezzullo, supra, at
297-98. See also UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 801 cmt. (Discussion
Draft 1993) (providing excellent explanation of tax treatment of limited liability
companies).
A limited liability company is classified as a partnership for federal tax pur-
poses because it does not possess sufficient corporate characteristics. Treas.
Regs. Sec. 301.7701-2 sets forth four corporate characteristics: continuity of
life, free transferability of interests, centralized management and limited li-
ability. An unincorporated entity will be classified as a partnership unless it
possesses at least three of these characteristics. Most limited liability com-
pany acts are drafted so that a limited liability company will fail the corpo-
rate classification test by lacking continuity of life and free transferability of
interests. Depending on the actual organization structure of a limited liabil-
ity company, it may also be possible for the entity to lack centralized man-
agement; however, all limited liability companies possess the corporate char-
acteristic of limited liability. In order for a limited liability company to lack
the corporate characteristic of continuity of life, the legal existence of the
entity must be capable of suffering an involuntary dissolution.
Id.
4 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-301 (1993) (governing admission of "mem-
bers"); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-632 (A)(3) (Supp. 1993) (indicating there will be two
or more "members" at time limited liability company formed); CA. S.B. 469, § 17001
(t), Reg. Sess. (1993) (indicating that limited liability company or domestic limited
liability company means an entity having two or more "members"); COLO. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 7-80-102(7) (West Supp. 1993) (defining limited liability company as having
two or more "members"); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.407(e) (West Supp. 1994) (providing
for admission of additional "members"); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7602(h) (1992) (defining
"members"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1305 (A), (C) (West 1994) (providing for articles
of organization contemplating "members"); MD. CODE ANN. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns § 4A-601
(1993) (providing for admission of "members"); MrmN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.11 (West
1994) (imposing two "member" requirement for organization); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 86.081 (Michie 1994) (defining "member" as one who owns interest in limited liabil-
ity company); N.Y.S. 27, 215th Sess. § 102(q) (1993) (defining "members" as persons
who have been admitted as "member" of limited liability company); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2001(15) (West Supp. 1994) (defining "member" as one with ownership inter-
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held companies 5 and are recommended for use in a diversity of
business ventures.' Most statutes permit management by mem-
bers themselves or by professional outside managers.7 An operat-
est); TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.22(A)(1)(a) (West Supp. 1994) (provid-
ing for lists of each "member"); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-116(f), (g) (1994) (contem-
plating "members" in articles of organization); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1002 (Supp.
1993) (indicating that "member" means person who owns interest in limited liability
company); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-2(10) (Supp. 1994) (defining "member" as one with
ownership interest); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 17-15-107(a)(vi)-(x) (Supp. 1994) (articles of
organization contemplating ownership by "members").
5 Limited liability companies are privately-held largely because of federal tax
consequences. See Mezzullo, supra note 3, at 297-98; Hamill, supra note 2, at 746-48.
The limited liability company is desirable because it combines the dual benefits of
limited liability and taxation as a partnership. See Hamill, supra note 2, at 723. Part-
nerships provide for flow-through tax treatment, which avoids double taxation and
provides benefits such as allocation of profit and loss arrangements. See Ribstein,
supra note 2, at 417; JACOB MERTENS, JR., MERTENS LAW OF FEDERAL INCoME TAXA-
TION § 35.359.70 (1993). A limited liability company would be taxed as a corporation
if it were publicly traded. See I.R.C. § 7704(a) (West 1994). Section 7704 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code taxes publicly-traded partnerships as corporations. Id. Thus, going
public would frustrate a principal purpose of forming a limited liability company.
6 Brian L. Schorr, co-chair of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York
and the New York State Bar Association Joint Drafting Committee of the Proposed
New York Limited Liability Company Law, indicates that limited liability companies
are desirable for use in the following types of businesses: a) corporate joint ventures;
b) entrepreneurial businesses; c) family businesses; d) start up businesses; e) high
technology and research businesses; ) oil and gas investments; g) investments in
theatrical productions; h) real estate investments; i) venture capital projects; j) profes-
sional organizations (e.g. lawyers and accountants); k) transactions involving interna-
tional investors; 1) management leveraged buy-outs; m) structured finance arrange-
ments; n) commodity pools. See Schorr, supra note 3, at 32-33; see also Ribstein, supra
note 2, at 427-33 (suggesting that both nonprofessional and professional firms may
elect to use limited liability company form). Schorr noted that "[elven in closely held
firms, limited liability may reduce owners' risk-bearing and monitoring costs." Id. at
428. Additionally, "[pirofessional firms are an important category of general partner-
ships and potentially important users of the L[imited] L[iability] Company] form." Id.
at 433. Since several states' professional corporation acts refuse to permit profession-
als to limit liability for acts of co-professionals, recognition of limited liability compa-
nies could eliminate a significant barrier for professional firms which is not present
for nonprofessional firms. Id.
7 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-402 (1993). This section provides:
Unless otherwise provided in a limited liability company agreement, the
management of a limited liability company shall be vested in its members in
proportion to the then current percentage or other interest of members in
the profits of the limited liability company owned by all of the members, the
decision of members owning more than 50 percent of the said percentage or
other interest in the profits controlling; provided however, that if a limited
liability company agreement provides for the management, in whole or in
part, of a limited liability company by a manager, the management of the
limited liability company, to the extent so provided, shall be vested in the
manager who shall be chosen by the members in the manner provided in the
limited liability company agreement.
1994]
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ing or management agreement governs business operations and
relationships among members of a limited liability company.'
Id.; see also ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-681(A) (1993) (providing that "[u]nless the
articles of organization provide that management of the limited liability company is
vested in one or more managers, management of the limited liability company is
vested in the members"); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401(1) (West Supp. 1993)
(stating that management of limited liability company shall be vested in manager or
managers); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring that manage-
ment, unless otherwise provided in articles of organization or regulations, shall be
vested in members, thus giving choice of management by member or manager); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 17-7612 (Supp. 1992) (stating that "[ulnless otherwise provided in the
articles of organization or the operating agreement, the management of the limited
liability company shall be vested in its members"); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1311
(West 1994) (indicating that, except as otherwise provided in articles of organization,
business of limited liability company shall be managed by members); N.Y.S. 27, 215th
Sess. § 401 (1993) (providing for management by members unless otherwise provided
in articles of organization); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.67 (West 1994) (requiring that
"limited liability company must have one or more natural persons exercising... func-
tions of... officers, however designated, of chief manager and treasurer"); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie 1994) (providing for choice of management by member or
manager); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2015 (1), (2) (West Supp. 1994) (indicating that
articles of organization may provide for management without designated managers);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-125 (1994) (providing for management by members unless
otherwise provided in articles of organization); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1022(A) (Supp.
1993) (authorizing management by members except to extent articles of organization
provide for management by manager); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116 (Supp. 1994) (vesting
management in members unless provision is made for managers).
8 See, e.g., UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 405 (Discussion Draft
1993) (providing for optional enactment of written or oral operating agreement to
provide for regulation of affairs of limited liability company); see also DEL. CODE ANN.
tit. 6, §§ 18-302, 18-402, 18-404, 18-1101(b) (1993) (providing for voting rights and
selection of management pursuant to limited liability agreement and indicating
policy of chapter to give maximum effect to principle of freedom of contract); Cal.
S.B. No. 469 § 17001(z)(aa) (contemplating operating agreement governing conduct of
business).
The Arizona statute contains a separate section which illustrates the important
role of the operating agreement in establishing guidelines for the conduct of business,
management matters, voting rights, and restrictions on transfers of interests:
A. The members of a limited liability company may adopt an operating
agreement containing provisions they deem appropriate. All or part of an
operating agreement may be subsequently repealed or amended by agree-
ment or consent of all of the members or, to the extent an operating agree-
ment so provides, by all of the managers or a specified portion of members or
managers.
B. An operating agreement may contain any provision that is consistent
with law and that relates to the business of the limited liability company,
the conduct of its affairs, its rights or powers and the rights or powers of its
members, managers, officers, employees or agents including:
1. Whether the management of the limited liability company is vested in
one or more managers and, if so, the powers to be exercised by managers.
2. Providing for classes or groups of members with various rights, powers
and duties and providing for the future creation of additional classes or
[Vol. 68:21
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Many commentators have provided overviews of limited lia-
bility company statutes, emphasizing the potential tax benefits.9
groups of members with relative rights, powers and duties superior, equal or
inferior to existing classes and groups of members.
3. The exercise or division of management or voting rights among different
classes or groups of members or managers on a per capita or other basis.
4. With respect to any matter requiring a vote, approval or consent of mem-
bers or managers, provisions relating to notice of the time, place and purpose
of any meeting at which the matter is to be voted on, waiver of notice, action
by consent without a meeting, the establishment of a record date, quorum
requirements, authorizations by proxy or any other matter concerning the
exercise of any voting or approval rights.
5. Restrictions on the transfer of any option rights to acquire or sell any
member's interest in the limited liability company.
6. A court may enforce an operating agreement by injunction or by any
other relief that the court in its discretion determines to be fair and appro-
priate in the circumstances.
AIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-682 (1993). The Colorado statute provides that operating
agreement means:
... any valid written agreement of the members as to the affairs of a limited
liability company and the conduct of its business. The operating agreement
may contain any provisions for the affairs of a limited liability company and
the conduct of its business to the extent that such provisions are not incon-
sistent with the law or the articles of organization.
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-102(11) (West Supp. 1993); see also FLA. STAT. ch.
608.432 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for transferability of interest in accordance
with operating agreement); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7613 (1992) (requiring operating
agreements to govern rights, duties, and obligations of members and managers which
may contain provisions for regulation and management of company); LA. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 12:1311 (West 1994) (providing for management in accordance with operating
agreement); MD. CODE ANN. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns § 4A-402 (1993) (indicating that mem-
bers may enter into operating agreement to regulate or establish any aspect of affairs
of limited liability company or relations of its members); N.Y.A. 8676 215th Sess.§ 417(a) (mandating operating agreement for conduct of business affairs); MInN. STAT.
ANN. § 322B.603(1) (West 1994) (providing for optional operating agreement gov-
erning management of business or regulation of affairs of limited liability company);
Nnv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.101 (Michie 1994) (defining operating agreement as "any
valid written agreement of... members as to the affairs of a limited liability company
and the conduct of its business"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2001(17) (West Supp.
1994) (defining operating agreement as "any agreement of the members as to the af-
fairs of a limited liability company and the conduct of its business"); TEx. Bus. CORP.
AcT ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.09 (West Supp. 1994) (referring to "regulations" which may
contain any provisions for regulation and management of limited liability company);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-126 (1994) (providing for execution of operating agreement
for regulation and management of affairs of limited liability company); VA. CODE ANN.
§ 13.1-1023 (Supp. 1993) (authorizing option of entering into operating agreement
governing conduct of business and relations of members); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-19
(1994) (permitting operating agreement for management of limited liability com-
pany); Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-119, 17-15-122 (Supp. 1994) (contemplating existence of
operating agreement in connection with division of profits and transfer of interests).
9 See supra note 3 and accompanying text (regarding taxation of limited liability
companies). The principal benefit of a limited liability company is taxation as a part-
19941
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Little attention, however, has been focused on the importance of
developing a viable statutory and judicial framework for analyz-
ing the legal relationships among members and managers. Specif-
ically, what fiduciary duties and what standard of care do mem-
bers owe each other in the conduct of the limited liability
company's business? What standard of care must managers exer-
cise? How is performance to be judged and what level of judicial
scrutiny is appropriate? What effect does the adoption of a partic-
ular standard of care have on third parties-outside stakeholders,
such as creditors, employees, or the public at large?
The traditional corporate approach employs a standard of due
care coupled with the application of the business judgment rule.10
The Model Business Corporation Act"1 provides that a director of
a corporation must, in good faith, exercise the care that an ordina-
rily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar
circumstances in a manner that person reasonably believes to be
in the best interests of the corporation. 2 The judiciary developed
the business judgment rule to insulate the director from exposure
when hindsight determines that an error was made.' 3 To what
extent should the standard of due care and the business judgment
rule be applied to members or managers of the limited liability
company?
nership pursuant to Revenue Ruling 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 361. See Thomas E. Geu,
Understanding the Limited Liability Company: A Basic Comparative Primer (Part
Two), 37 S.D. L. REV. 467, 468 (1992). Such treatment avoids the 34% entity-level tax
imposed on corporations under § 11 of the Internal Revenue Code. Taxation as a
partnership also permits flexible allocation of a partner's distributive share of profits
and losses under § 704 of the Internal Revenue Code. Partnership tax treatment pro-
vides several noteworthy advantages over taxation as an S corporation. Although S
corporations are generally not subject to double taxation at the shareholder and cor-
porate levels, S corporations are subject to many restrictions which are not applicable
to partnerships. For example, only individuals other than nonresident aliens, estates,
and certain types of trusts may own stock in an S corporation pursuant to § 1361 of
the Internal Revenue Code. No more than 35 shareholders may own stock in an S
corporation. Further, an S corporation may have only one class of stock. Because of
the limitations regarding foreign taxpayers, the limited liability company is a highly
desirable entity in which to conduct joint U.S.-foreign ventures.
10 See infra notes 36-71 and accompanying text (discussing duty of care and busi-
ness judgment rule).
11 See MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.30(a) (1984).
12 Id. The official comment focuses on the manner in which the duty is per-
formed, not the correctness of the decision.
13 See infra notes 43-71 and accompanying text (discussing the business judg-
ment rule).
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This Article suggests that the hands-off judicial posture sup-
ported by the business judgment rule is ill-suited to the limited
liability company. There are fundamental differences between the
public corporation and the privately held limited liability com-
pany.14 The traditional corporate approach has created a founda-
tion for the oppression of minority shareholders. 15 There is every
reason to believe that this approach would be similarly problem-
atic if applied to the conduct of members and managers of the lim-
ited liability company. 6
Likewise, a model for behavior which defers exclusively to the
contract between the parties is as troublesome as the exclusive
use of the corporate model. A purely contractual approach ignores
the reality of doing business on an ongoing basis. It fails to distin-
14 See infra note 26 and accompanying text (discussing IRS requirement that lim-
ited liability company be privately held).
15 See Krishnan S. Chittur, Resolving Close Corporation Conflicts: A Fresh Ap-
proach, 10 HARv. J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 129, 129 (1987).
Close corporations present peculiar problems in corporate law. Although the
necessity of treating them as "sui generis" was recognized long ago the legal
framework is as yet incomplete. Piecemeal legislation and ad hoc judicial
interpretations have left a patchwork of ill-matched rules and a history of
victimized minority shareholders. The precedents suggest that the law ex-
acts a price from the minority shareholder that can be extortionately high
.... I suggest that such a result is neither equitable nor necessary, but
follows from fundamental conceptual errors. The business judgment rule
should not be applied at all. Present moves to liberate close corporations
from the shackles of general corporation law are salubrious, but a fresh ap-
proach is needed for a complete solution to the problems posed by close cor-
porations. A new perception of the close corporation is needed if the contem-
porary push to special legislation is to realize its goals.
Id. (footnote omitted); see also infra notes 187-94.
16 See Sylvester J. Orsi, Comment, The Limited Liability Company, An Organiza-
tional Alternative For Small Business, 70 NEB. L. REV. 150, 160 (1991).
L[imited] L[iability] C[ompanyl's require consent of all members before all of
the attributes of ownership may be transferred, and therefore inhibit forma-
tion of an efficient market for sale of ownership interests .... [A] conse-
quence of decreased state regulation is that the courts must pay greater at-
tention to the duties owed by members to each other, and by managers to
members. Because there will be no ready market for members to sell their
interests, there will accordingly be no barometer to reflect member dissatis-
faction with management decisions. Furthermore, managing members may
attempt to freeze out non-managing members with methods developed by
shareholders of close corporations. For these reasons it makes little sense to
adopt the hands-off approach of the "business judgment rule," applied princi-
pally to decisions of public corporations. The better rule would be to scruti-
nize the decisions of managers and members with the standard of utmost
good faith and loyalty often used in both the partnership and close corpora-
tion settings.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see infra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
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guish between a contract for the consummation of a single event
and an agreement to conduct business over a long period of time.
Furthermore, the contractual approach presumes an equality of
bargaining power among members and that important issues will
indeed be negotiated. The history of the close corporation has
demonstrated that businesses evolve, generations progress, struc-
tural and ownership changes occur, formalities are ignored, and
even fundamental issues may not always be negotiated or renego-
tiated.17 The same problems which have occurred in the context of
close corporations may well be repeated in a limited liability com-
pany in which some members possess controlling interests, and
others assume minority positions.
In the drive to adopt limited liability company legislation
quickly, states may find it expedient to import statutory language
borrowed entirely from existing partnership or corporate stat-
utes.1 8 The limited liability company, however, incorporates a
unique blend of corporate, partnership, contractual, and agency
relationships. Accordingly, a blended approach to standards of
conduct is needed to protect effectively one member of a limited
liability company from the actions or inaction of another member
or manager. The Discussion Draft of the Uniform Limited Liabil-
ity Company Act, which incorporates both partnership and con-
tractual standards of conduct, is a starting point.19
17 See F. Hodge O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recom-
mended Reform, 33 Bus. LAw. 873, 881-83 (1978). O'Neal notes:
Statutory protection is needed for minority shareholders who fail to bargain
for and obtain protective contractual arrangements. Although most state
corporation statutes validate special charter and bylaw provisions and
shareholder's agreements designed to protect minority shareholders, no stat-
ute-not even any of the separate, integrated close corporation statutes-
furnishes adequate self-executing protection for minority shareholders who
have failed to bargain for special charter or bylaw provisions or for protec-
tive clauses in shareholders' agreements .... He [the minority shareholder]
may be unaware of the risks involved, or his bargaining position may be so
weak that he is unable to negotiate for protection. Further, he may have
been given or may have inherited his minority interest.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18 See Orsi, supra note 16, at 152 (indicating that "because the limited liability
company borrows most of its statutory language, business planners will benefit from a
vast body of authority interpreting its provisions in their original corporate or part-
nership form").
19 See UNIF. LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY ACT § 408 (Discussion Draft). The Dis-
cussion Draft of the Limited Liability Company Act is in the process of being devel-
oped by a committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State




The purpose of this Article is to assist in the development of
a coherent approach to standards of conduct among members and
managers of the limited liability company. Part I analyzes the
major features of a limited liability company which distinguish it
from other legal entities. Part II discusses the duties of loyalty
and the standard of care which have evolved under the corporate,
partnership, contractual, and agency models. Part III reviews the
standards of conduct contained in existing and proposed limited
liability company legislation. It further considers the Discussion
Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act as proposed
by a committee of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws. Part IV intends to assist in developing a
fresh analytical approach to standards of conduct. It reviews so-
cial policy concerns that are specific to the limited liability com-
pany. It also discusses the inadequacy of the exclusive employ-
ment of existing corporate, partnership, or contractual models.
Finally, Part V recommends a blended approach to standards
of conduct which integrates agency, partnership, and contractual
principles. Although the Discussion Draft of the Uniform Act may
provide an excellent starting point for an integrated approach, it
utilizes a gross negligence standard of conduct. The more appro-
priate standard is one based on agency principles of due care or
ordinary negligence. The due care standard, a logical extension of
agency principles, 20 is already contained in several limited liabil-
ity company statutes, and moreover, is consistent with the reason-
able expectations of the parties. 21 If not overpowered by an ex-
20 See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958) which provides:
Unless otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to
act with standard care and with the skill which is standard in the locality for
the kind of work which he is employed to perform and, in addition, to exer-
cise any special skill that he has.
Id.; see infra notes 139-46 and accompanying text.
21 See Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., Duty of Care: The Partnership Cases, 15 OKLA.
Crry U. L. REV. 753, 765-66 (1990). Professor Beveridge, member of the American
Bar Association Committee on Partnerships and Unincorporated Business Organiza-
tions and the Subcommittee on the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, advocates ordi-
nary negligence as the appropriate standard of care regarding the duty of one partner
to another. Id. The same arguments are equally persuasive regarding the limited
liability company. A heated debate took place regarding whether the Revised Uni-
form Partnership Act should embrace a standard of care among partners based on
gross negligence or ordinary negligence. Professor Beveridge argues that the appro-
priate standard should be based on ordinary care, noting:
[Slince the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act are default provisions
which apply in the absence of a contrary agreement, they should reflect legit-
imate expectations of the parties. It is not likely that a partner, to the extent
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pansive application of the business judgment rule, a due care
standard may foster increased responsibility by members and
managers of closely held business enterprises that have histori-
cally abused minority and passive owners.22 Against this back-
ground of dissension and abuse, a stricter standard of care should
be encouraged along with an active rather than passive judicial
role.
I. THE NATURE OF THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY
From a legal perspective, limited liability companies are a
unique construct.2 3 In some respects, they resemble corporations
because they offer an umbrella of limited liability.24 In many
that he considers the question, would expect his co-partners to be held to a
lower standard of care than employees of the partnership. If anything, the
contrary would be true. A partner would naturally expect a co-partner to
indemnify the partnership for loss caused by that partner's negligence and
gross error of judgment before he would expect the same of an employee.
Id.
22 A review of case law on limited partnerships reveals a history of abuse by gen-
eral partners of limited partners. See Johnson v. J. Hiram Moore, Ltd., 763 S.W.2d
496, 499 (Tex. 1988); Roper v. Thomas, 298 S.E.2d 424, 430-31 (N.C. 1982); Palmisano
v. Mascaro, 611 So.2d 632, 642-43 (La. 1992); 105 East Second Street Assocs. v. Bo-
brow, 175 A.D.2d 746 (N.Y. 1991). But see American Garden Homes v. Gelbart Fur
Dressing, 606 N.E.2d 106, 111 (Ill. 1992). A similar pattern emerges with regard to
majority shareholders vis-a-vis minority shareholders. See infra notes 109, 193-95
and accompanying text.
23 While it is true that express state statutory language may be borrowed from
limited partnership acts or corporate statutes, the limited liability company contains
a unique combination of features. See Orsi, supra note 16, at 151-52.
The drafters of this legislation expressly intended to provide business plan-
ners with an alternative to corporations and partnerships. Typically, busi-
ness planners focus on two considerations when deciding how to organize a
business: The applicable nontax state law; and the income tax treatment of
the business form chosen. For small business enterprises, the L[imited]
L[iability] C[ompany] possesses the best of both worlds because it combines
the attractive limited liability feature of corporations with the income tax
advantages of partnership classification. In addition, L[imited] L[iability]
C[ompanie]s are more flexible than S corporations in accommodating vari-
ous forms of ownership .... Because the L[imited] L[iability] C[ompany]
borrows most of its statutory language, business planners will benefit from a
vast body of authority interpreting its provisions in their original corporate
or partnership form.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
24 See ARiz. R.v. STAT. ANN. § 29-651 (Supp. 1993). This section states:
Except as provided in this chapter, a member, manager, employee, officer, or
agent of a limited liability company is not liable, solely by reason of being a
member, manager, employee, officer or agent, for the debts, obligations and
liabilities of the limited liability company whether arising in contract or tort,
under a judgment, decree or order of a court or otherwise.
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Id. (footnote omitted); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-705 (West Supp. 1993) ("Mem-
bers and managers of limited liability companies are not liable under a judgment,
decree, or order of a court, or in any other manner, for a debt, obligation, or liability of
the limited liability company."); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-303 (1993). The Delaware
statute states:
Except as otherwise provided by this chapter, the debts, obligations and lia-
bilities of a limited liability company, whether arising in contract, tort or
otherwise, shall be solely the debts, obligations and liabilities of the limited
liability company; and no member or manager of a limited liability company
shall be obligated personally for any such debt, obligation or liability of the
limited liability company solely by reason of being a member or acting as a
manager of the limited liability company.
Id. For similar language see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.436 (West Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 17-7620 (1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1315 (West 1994) (authorizing lim-
ited liability if articles of organization or written operating agreement so provide);
OxLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2017A.1 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for permissive lim-
ited liability pursuant to articles of organization or operating agreement); VA. CODE
ANN. § 13.1-1019 (Michie 1993); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-113 (Supp. 1994).
Some states qualify the limited liability of the members by expressly incorporat-
ing corporate rules for piercing the corporate veil of limited liability. See, e.g., Mnq.
STAT. ANN. § 322B.303 (West Supp. 1994). The Minnesota statute provides:
1. Limited liability rule. Subject to subdivision 2, a member, governor, man-
ager, or other agent of a limited liability company is not, merely on account
of this status, personally liable for the acts, debts, liabilities, or obligations of
the limited liability company. Subdivision 2. Piercing the veil. The case law
that states the conditions and circumstances under which the corporate veil
of a corporation may be pierced under Minnesota law also applies to limited
liability companies.
Id.; see also VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1025 (Supp. 1993). The Virginia statute provides:
[T]he damages assessed against a manager or member arising out of a single
transaction, occurrence or course of conduct shall not exceed the lesser of: 1.
The monetary amount, including the elimination of liability, specified in
writing in the articles of organization or an operating agreement as a limita-
tion on or elimination of the liability of the manager or member; or 2. The
greater of (i) $100,000 or (ii) the amount of cash compensation received by
the manager or member from the limited liability company during the
twelve months immediately preceding the act or omission for which liability
was imposed. B. The liability of a manager or member shall not be limited
as provided in this section to the extent otherwise provided in writing in the
articles of organization or an operating agreement, or if the manager or
member engaged in willful misconduct or a knowing violation of the criminal
law. C. No limitation on or elimination of liability adopted pursuant to this
section may be affected by any amendment of the articles of organization or
operating agreement with respect to any act or omission occurring before
such amendment.
Id. A slightly different statutory approach in achieving limited liability is to provide
that the members of the limited liability company shall be treated as shareholders of
corporations. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-33 (Supp. 1994). The West Virginia stat-
ute states:
The members of a limited liability company shall have the same rights and
liabilities as shareholders of corporations organized or registered under arti-
cle one (§ 31-1-1 et seq.) of this chapter, and such managers shall have the
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other respects, they resemble partnerships.2 5 Like partners,
members have control of management either because the limited
liability company members choose to manage the business them-
selves, or because the members exercise their power to elect
managers. Additionally, they are privately owned,26 governed
largely according to the provisions of an operating or managing
agreement, may lack formality,28 and are taxed as partner-
same rights and liabilities as directors of corporations so organized or
registered.
Id.
25 Some state statutes vest management in proportion to capital contributions,
while others defer to the operating agreement with regard to management rights. See
ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-682 (Supp. 1993) (providing for management pursuant to
operating agreement); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-401 (Supp. 1993) (providing for
management by manager, except as otherwise provided); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-
402 (1993) (providing for management vesting in members proportionate to then cur-
rent percentage or other interest in profits unless otherwise provided in limited liabil-
ity company agreement, and also permitting management by managers chosen by
members in accordance with limited liability company agreement); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 608.422 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for management vesting in members in pro-
portion to their contributions to capital unless otherwise provided in articles of organ-
ization, and also permitting management by annually elected manager); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 12-1312-13 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for management by members,
except as otherwise provided, and also permitting management by managers); MNN.
STAT. ANN. § 322.B67 (West Supp. 1994) (requiring that limited liability company
must have one or more natural persons exercising functions of offices however desig-
nated by chief manager and treasurer); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie 1994)
(vesting management in members in proportion to their contribution to capital, per-
mitting annually elected managers); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 2013-2015 (West
Supp. 1994) (permitting management by manager or member); TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT
ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.09 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing regulations of limited liabil-
ity company to govern management and business); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-126
(1994) (providing for operating agreement for management and conduct of business);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-1023 to -1024 (Michie 1993) (providing for operating agree-
ment and management by manager or members); W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-18 (Supp.
1994) (stating that unless otherwise provided, members shall vote in proportion to
their contributions, and management is vested in members); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-116
(Supp. 1994) (providing for management by members in proportion to their contribu-
tion to capital, but also permitting management by manager).
26 The I.R.C. taxes publicly-traded partnerships as corporations. I.R.C. § 7704
(West 1994). Therefore, to avoid losing tax benefits, the limited liability company is
not publicly traded.
27 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
28 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1106 (1993) (illustrating rela-
tively informal nature of limited liability company). Section 18-201 of the Delaware
statute provides rules for formation, indicating that one or more authorized persons
must execute a certificate of formation designating the name, address, and dissolution
date, if any, of the company. Section 18-302 governs classes and voting, and broadly
permits voting rights to be determined by the limited liability company agreement.
Section 18-302(b) provides that the "agreement may grant to all or certain identified
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members or a specified class or group of the members the right to vote separately or
with all or any class or group of the members or managers ... ." Subsection 18-302(c)
permits the limited liability company agreement to establish provisions relating to
notice of the time, place, or purpose of the meetings regarding the right to vote. Sec-
tion 18-402 calls for management by members in proportion to their interest in profits
unless otherwise provided in the limited liability agreement, and permits manage-
ment by managers. Section 18-503 states that profits and losses are to be allocated in
accordance with the limited liability company agreement. Absent an agreement pro-
viding to the contrary, a default rule is provided which allocates profits and losses on
the basis of the agreed value of contributions made by members. Section 18-702 con-
tains a critical prohibition on transferability of interests which deprives the limited
liability company of the free transferability characteristic of corporations. The same
section provides that assignees shall have no right to participate in management ex-
cept upon approval of all members other than the member assigning his interest, or
upon compliance with any procedure provided for in the limited liability company
agreement. Section 18-801 contains rules on dissolution which prevent the limited
liability company from possessing the corporate characteristic of continuity of life.
Dissolution takes place upon the first to occur of the following:
1) [a]t the time specified in a limited liability agreement, or 30 years from
the date of formation... 2) [u]pon the happening of events specified in a
limited liability company agreement; 3) [t]he written consent of the mem-
bers; 4) [t~he death, retirement, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy or disso-
lution of a member or the occurrence of any other event which terminates
the continued membership of a member in the limited liability company un-
less the business of the company is continued either by the consent of al the
remaining members within 90 days following the occurrence of any such
event or pursuant to a right to continue stated in the limited liability com-
pany agreement; or 5) [tlhe entry of a decree of judicial dissolution ....
Id. § 18-801.
Other states contain similar provisions, varying somewhat in the degree of flexi-
bility. See, e.g., Ca.S.B. No. 469, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. Section 17050 of the California
Senate proposal provides for the execution and filing of articles of organization with
the Secretary of State, and requires the filing of an operating agreement. There must
be two or more members. Id. § 17050. The articles of organization must contain the
purpose of the enterprise, whether the company is a professional limited liability com-
pany, the name and address of the agent for service of process, and several other
enumerated items. Section 17100 governs membership and contains a default rule
requiring unanimous written consent for entrance of a new member into the limited
liability company. Section 17103 permits voting pursuant to the articles of organiza-
tion or the operating agreement, and contains a default rule which provides for voting
in proportion to the members' interests in current profits. Specified matters require
unanimous consent of all of the members including the decision to continue the busi-
ness after dissolution or approval of the transfer of a membership interest and admis-
sion of the assignee as a member of the limited liability company. Id. § 17103. Section
17150 provides for management by either managers or members. Section 17250 pro-
vides for distributions in accordance with the partnership agreement, and a default
rule which authorizes distributions which are a return of capital in accordance with
each member's capital contribution. Under § 17350 the limited liability company dis-
solves upon a) the time specified in the articles of organization; b) upon the happening
of events stated in the articles of organization; c) by the vote of the majority in inter-
est of the members; d) unless otherwise provided in the articles, or operating agree-
ment, upon the death, withdrawal, resignation, expulsion, bankruptcy, or dissolution
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ships.29 Rather than declaring dividends, profits are typically
shared in a manner not unlike a partnership. °
Flexibility, favorable taxation, and limited liability are indeed
the benchmarks which have spawned the proliferation of limited
liability company legislation. Nevertheless, the very flexibility
that makes the limited liability company an attractive business
organization may ultimately lead to abuses unless the appropriate
of a member, unless the business of the limited liability company is continued by a
vote of all the remaining members within 90 days of the termination; or e) judicial
dissolution.
Other statutes provide more extensive regulations. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 322B.34 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for notice procedures regarding all meetings);
Id. § 322B.343 (governing electronic conferences and waiver of notice provisions); Id.
§ 322B.346 (setting forth rules for majority rule and voting by class); Id. § 322B.383
(authorizing rights of dissenting members); N.Y.S. 27, 215th Sess. §§ 402-04 (1993)
(providing increased regulation of voting rights through § 402, and increased regula-
tions of meetings and quorums through §§ 403-04).
29 See supra note 2 and accompanying text.
30 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-703 (Supp. 1993) (providing for interim distribu-
tions in accordance with operating agreement, and default rule providing for distribu-
tions in proportion to capital contributions); CoLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-504 (West
Supp. 1993) (providing for distributions in accordance with written operating agree-
ment, and in absence of agreement, in accordance with value per company records of
members' contributions); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-601 (1993) (providing for interim
distributions upon happening of the events specified in limited liability company
agreement); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.426 (West Supp. 1994) (providing for distribution
of property to members upon basis stipulated in regulations, provided that distribu-
tion does not cause insolvency); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7615 (1992) (authorizing distri-
butions in accordance with operating agreement, provided assets of limited liability
company do not exceed liabilities, excluding liabilities for member contributions); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1324 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing distributions in accordance
with operating agreement, and in absence of such agreement, directing that distribu-
tions be made equally to all members); MD. CODE ANN. CoRPs & ASS'NS § 4A-505
(1993) (stating that unless otherwise provided in operating agreement, profits and
losses are allocated in proportion to members' capital interest, and distributions made
in proportion to members' rights to share in profits); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.50
(West Supp. 1994) (including default rule for distributions in accordance with value of
contributions of members); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.341 (Michie 1994) (providing
for distribution of profits in accordance with operating agreement); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 2025 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing distributions in proportion to respective
capital interests and members' rights to share in profits unless otherwise provided);
TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 1528n, § 5.03 (West Supp. 1994) (asserting that, unless
otherwise provided, distributions must be made on basis of agreed value of members'
contributions); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1029 (Michie 1993) (stating that distributions
made in accordance with value of members' capital contributions, unless otherwise
provided); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1A-24 (Supp. 1994) (providing default rule for dis-
tribution of profits in accordance with value of contributions); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-119
(Supp. 1994) (providing for distributions in accordance with operating agreement,
provided that after distributions are made liabilities do not exceed assets).
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degrees of judicial and statutory scrutiny and regulation are
present. 1
Unlike corporations, the limited liability company lacks a
board of directors. Traditionally, the role of the board of directors
has been to govern the corporation independently.32 From its in-
ception, the corporate form has been a highly regulated legal en-
tity. A historical review of the corporation reveals that prior to the
enactment of modern corporate legislation, individuals were re-
quired to obtain a special corporate charter in order to utilize the
corporate form. 3 Under modern corporate law, virtually every
facet of business operations, including corporate dissolution, re-
mains subject to strict statutory regulation. 4 In contrast, many
31 See Orsi, supra note 16, at 160 (observing that decreased state regulation may
require increased attention by courts to duties owed by members to each other and by
managers to members).
32 See generally Bayless Manning, The Business Judgment Rule and the Direc-
tor's Duty of Attention: Time For Reality, 39 Bus. LAw. 1477, 1481-92 (1984) (empha-
sizing complex demands on Board of Directors and highlighting diversity of today's
business operations). Outside directors essentially devote only part time hours to
company affairs. Id.
33 See LAWRENCE M. FRIED= AN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 446-48 (1973) (indi-
cating that early American corporations were authorized by special charter and were
involved in transportation and other functions which were traditionally within scope
of state regulation); Liggett v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-64 (1933) (Brandeis, J., dissent-
ing) (providing excellent discussion of emergence of corporate form). In Liggett, Jus-
tice Brandeis noted:
The prevalence of the corporation in America has led men of this generation
to act, at times, as if the privilege of doing business in corporate form were
inherent in the citizen .... Throughout the greater part of our history a
different view prevailed. Although the value of this instrumentality in com-
merce and industry was fully recognized, incorporation for business was
commonly denied.., because of fear .... There was a sense of some insidi-
ous menace inherent in large aggregations of capital, particularly when held
by corporations. So at first the corporate privilege was granted sparingly...
when... necessary... to procure... some specific benefit otherwise unat-
tainable. The later enactment of general incorporation laws does not signify
that the apprehension of corporate domination had been overcome. The de-
sire for business expansion created an irresistible demand for more charters;
and it was believed that under general laws embodying safeguards of univer-
sal application the scandals and favoritism incident to special incorporation
could be avoided. The general laws ... were, in part, an expression of the
desire for equality of opportunity.
Id. at 548-49 (citations omitted).
34 See MODEL Busnmss CORP. ACT ANN. § 2.01 (Proposed official draft 1984) (re-
garding filing requirements to incorporate); Id. § 8.01 (regarding requirements for
and duties of board of directors); id. § 10.01 (regarding amendment of articles of incor-
poration and bylaws); id. §§ 11.01-.07 (regarding merger and share exchange); id.
§§ 13.30-31 (regarding judicial appraisal of shares); id. §§ 14.01-.34 (regarding
dissolution).
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limited liability company statutes lack significant formalities and
provide for management by members or managers. 5
II. EXISTING STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
Before considering which standard of conduct is best suited to
the hybrid nature of the limited liability company, it is important
to fully understand the models of conduct existing in current cor-
porate, partnership, and agency law. An analysis of the rules gov-
erning business relationships between directors and shareholders,
partners, and principals and agents reveals diverse standards and
levels of judicial scrutiny.
A. The Corporate Model: The Duty of Loyalty and the Duty of
Care
The corporate model of governance rests upon the fundamen-
tal distinction in the roles of owners and management, and the
recognition of the corporation as a separate legal entity.3 6 There
is an emerging trend to contractually limit board member liability
and to circumscribe judicial intervention in matters of corporate
governance. 37 Whether this trend should be reflected in the devel-
35 See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
36 See David E. Roseberry, Traditional Corporate Concepts in Light of Demands
for Elastic Norms for the Family or Closely Held Corporation, 5 J. CORP. L. 455, 458-
61 (1980).
Corporate forms of organized activity have developed a history with roots as
ancient as the Roman Empire. In the common law scheme, doctrines of cor-
porate-shareholder separateness evolved almost as an indirect result of the
growth of the corporate form .... Much contemporary and historical con-
cern with the concept of corporate-shareholder separateness has centered
upon the legal theories supporting the concept and the practical ramifica-
tions of limited shareholder liability for corporate debts, duties and obliga-
tions. Specific inquiries into the conceptual nature of corporate personality
have been undertaken ....
Id. at 458.
37 See Larry E. Ribstein, Unlimited Contracting in the Delaware Limited Partner-
ship and Its Implications for Corporate Law, 16 J. CORP. L. 299, 299 (1991) (discuss-
ing new Delaware limited partnership amendment which provides for waiver of fidu-
ciary duties in limited partnerships); see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(d)
(1993). Ribstein argues that waiver of fiduciary duty should apply to corporate law,
stating: "In adopting its limited partnership fiduciary duty waiver provision, the Del-
aware legislature has taken a critical step that has important implications for corpo-
rate law. There is no theoretical reason why freedom of contract should not be ex-
tended to the corporation once it has been adopted in the limited partnership."
Ribstein, supra, at 314; see John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in
Corporate Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1618 (1989) (dis-
cussing role of judiciary in debate between "contractarians," who favor adoption of
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opment of standards of conduct for members and managers of the
limited liability company remains open to question.
Traditionally, the duties of directors and officers have been
divided into separate categories, including the duty of loyalty and
the duty of care. As described in the Corporate Director's Guide-
book, these responsibilities are as follows:
1. Duty of Loyalty
By assuming his office, the corporate director commits alle-
giance to the enterprise and acknowledges that the best interests
of the corporation and its shareholders must prevail over any in-
dividual interest of his own. The basic principle to be observed is
that the director should not use his corporate position to make a
personal profit or gain other personal advantage.
2. Duty of Care
In addition to owing a duty of loyalty to the corporation, the
corporate director also assumes a duty to act carefully in fulfil-
ling the important tasks of monitoring and directing the activi-
ties of corporate management. 8
The Model Business Corporation Act sets forth general stan-
dards of conduct for directors. Section 8.30 of the Act states:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including
his duties as a member of a committee:
1) in good faith;
2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like posi-
tion would exercise under similar circumstances; and
3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation.
39
"opt-out" provisions to permit parties to contractually limit duties of care, and their
opponents); Deborah A. DeMott, Limiting Directors' Liability, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 295
(1988) (addressing substantial risks of director liability); Harvey Gelb, Director Due
Care Liability: An Assessment of the New Statutes, 61 TEMP. L. REv. 13, 13 (1988)
(reviewing "flood of legislation aimed at giving directors of corporations relief... from
liability for breach of their duty of care").
38 See A cEPCAN LAW INsT., PRINciPLEs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYsIs
AND RECOMMENDATIONS, Pt. IV Duty of Care and the Business Judgment Rule, Intro-
ductory Note, 137 (1992) [hereinafter ALI] (citing The Corporate Director's Guidebook
at 1599-1600).
39 MODEL BusnEss CORP. AcT ANN. § 8.30 (Comm. on Corp. Laws of the A.B.A.
1984). The board member's duties are elaborated as follows:
(b) In discharging his duties a director is entitled to rely on information,
opinions, reports, or statements... if prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation whom the direc-
tor reasonably believes to be reliable and competent in the matters
presented;
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The vast majority of states "require[s] that a director of a cor-
poration discharge the duties of [the] office in good faith and with
a stated standard of care, usually phrased in terms of the care
that an ordinarily prudent person would exercise under similar
"140circumstances ....
B. A Bark Worse Than Its Bite?
Although the due care language regarding managerial powers
of directors appears demanding, a number of factors significantly
dilute the stringency of the director's standard of conduct.41 First,
the business judgment rule has long been invoked to insulate di-
rectors from liability. Second, the American Law Institute's Prin-
ciples of Corporate Governance recommends modifications which
liberalize the standards for judicial review of business decisions.
Third, numerous states have enacted specific opt out provisions
which permit directors to contractually limit liability.42 This leg-
islation has followed in the wake of several court decisions impos-
ing liability on corporate directors.
The business judgment rule, an established legal doctrine,
has afforded corporate directors and officers substantial protection
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as to matters the
director reasonably believes are within the person's professional or ex-
pert competence; or
(3) a committee of the board of directors of which he is not a member if
the director reasonably believes the committee merits confidence.
(c) A director is not acting in good faith if he has knowledge concerning the
matter in question that makes reliance otherwise permitted by subsection
(b) unwarranted.
(d) A director is not liable for any action taken as a director, or any failure to
take any action, if he performed the duties of his office in compliance with
this section.
Id.
40 Id. § 8.30 annot. 1(a) (Supp. 1993). Thirty-nine states have followed the direc-
tion of the Model Business Corporation Act and imposed a statutory standard of care
on directors, including Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine,
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee,
Washington, Wisconsin, Wyoming, and Virginia. Id.; see also id. at annot. 3 ("Thirty-
five states have laws which reduce or eliminate a director's personal liability.., for a
breach of the director's fiduciary duty ....").
41 See Gelb, supra note 37, at 14 (noting that Model Business Corporation Act and
many state statutes dilute directors' standard of conduct).
42 See infra notes 64-71 and accompanying text (discussing waiver provisions ap-
plicable to the duties of corporate directors).
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from close judicial scrutiny.43 In Gries Sports Enterprises, Inc. v.
Cleveland Browns Football Co., a shareholder brought a deriva-
tive action against corporate directors.44 The shareholder chal-
lenged the fairness of an acquisition of another corporation.45 The
court described the business judgment rule as follows:
The business judgment rule is a principle of corporate govern-
ance that has been part of the common law for at least one hun-
dred fifty years. It has traditionally operated as a shield to pro-
tect directors from liability for their decisions. If the directors
are entitled to the protection of the rule, then the courts should
not interfere with or second-guess their decisions. If the direc-
tors are not entitled to the protection of the rule, then the courts
scrutinize the decision as to its intrinsic fairness to the corpora-
tion and the corporation's minority shareholders. The rule is a
rebuttable presumption that directors are better equipped than
the courts to make business judgments and that the directors ac-
ted without self-dealing or personal interest and exercised rea-
sonable diligence and acted with good faith. A party challenging
a board of directors' decision bears the burden of rebutting the
presumption that the decision was a proper exercise of the busi-
ness judgment of the board. 6
The rationale of the business judgment rule is to encourage
and afford broad protection to informed business decisions, irre-
spective of whether these decisions prove erroneous.4 7 The policy
underlying the rule encourages risk taking, innovation, and crea-
tive entrepreneurial activities.4 s
43 As early as 1891, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the degree of care to which
defendant directors were held was "that which ordinarily prudent and diligent men
would exercise under similar circumstances." Briggs v. Spaulding, 141 U.S. 132, 152
(1891). The history of the business judgment rule in tempering the duties of directors
is discussed extensively in DENNis J. BLOCK ET AL., THE BusiNEss JuDGmrr RULE 4-
8 (3d ed. 1989).
44 496 N.E.2d 959 (Ohio 1986).
45 Id. at 962.
46 Id. at 963-64 (citations omitted).
47 See A. Gilchrist Sparks, III & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Common Law Duties
of Non-Director Corporate Officers, 48 Bus. LAW. 215, 230 (1992); see also BLOCK ET
AL., supra note 43, at 6-7 (stating that rationale for business judgment rule is to "en-
courage[ ] competent individuals to assume directorships... [to] provide[ ] directors
the broad discretion they need in formulating ... company policy ... [to] keep[ I]
courts from becoming enmeshed in complex corporate decision-making... [and to]
ensure[ ] that directors rather than shareholders manage corporations") (citations
omitted).
48 See ALI, supra note 38, at 135. The policy behind the business judgment rule
is described as follows:
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The majority of cases relying on the business judgment rule
have afforded broader protection to directors and officers than a
"reasonableness" test might otherwise provide.49 In Auerbach v.
Bennett,50 for example, questionable payments were made to pub-
lic officials or political parties in foreign countries. An audit com-
mittee found evidence of over eleven million dollars of kickbacks.5 1
Auerbach, a shareholder, instituted a shareholder's derivative ac-
tion against the directors and the corporation's auditor.52 A spe-
cial litigation committee comprised of three disinterested directors
was formed and determined that no proper interest of the corpora-
tion would be served by asserting a claim against it.5" The New
York Court of Appeals held that the "substantive aspects of a deci-
sion to terminate a shareholders' derivative action against defend-
ant corporate directors made by a committee of disinterested di-
rectors [were] . . . beyond judicial inquiry under the business
judgment doctrine ... The court, however, could inquire into
The basic policy underpinning of the business judgment rule is that corpo-
rate law should encourage, and afford broad protection to, informed business
judgments (whether subsequent events prove the judgments right or wrong)
in order to stimulate risk taking, innovation, and other creative en-
trepreneurial activities. Shareholders accept the risk that an informed busi-
ness decision... may not be vindicated by subsequent success. The special
protection afforded business judgments is also based on a desire to limit liti-
gation and judicial intrusiveness with respect to private-sector business de-
cision making.
Id.
49 Id. § 4.01(c) cmt. (c) at 180. Broader protection than a reasonableness test was
said to exist in a large majority of cases. See, e.g., Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM
Acquisition Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 289 (2d Cir. 1986) (reasoning that directors exercised
"independent" judgment); Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 294 (7th Cir.)
("The presumption of good faith the business judgment rule affords is heightened
when the majority of the board consists of independent outside directors."), cert. de-
nied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); Abbey v. Control Data Corp. 603 F.2d 724, 730 (8th Cir.
1979) ("[T]he rule apparently applies to any reasonable good faith determination by
an independent board of directors .... ."), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v.
General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978) ("[Clourts have some
limited power to review the reasonableness of the directors' judgment . . . ."), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954
(Del. 1985) (employing any rational business test); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805,
812 (Del. 1984) (predicating director liability on gross negligence); Sinclair Oil Corp.
v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971) (employing rational basis test); Warshaw v.
Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) (using bad faith or gross abuse of discre-
tion); see also ALI, supra note 38, §,4.01(c), at 186 (citing additional cases).
50 393 N.E.2d 994 (N.Y. 1979).





the disinterested independence of the committee.5 5 The court de-
scribed the business judgment doctrine as follows:
ITlhe business judgment doctrine, at least in part, is grounded in
the prudent recognition that courts are ill equipped and infre-
quently called on to evaluate what are and must be essentially
business judgments .... [B]y definition the responsibility for
business judgments must rest with the corporate directors; their
individual capabilities and experience peculiarly qualify them for
the discharge of that responsibility. Thus, absent evidence of
bad faith or fraud ... the courts must and properly should re-
spect their determinations. 56
While many courts have taken a hands-off approach to direc-
tors' liability,57 a few courts have taken a more restrictive view of
the business judgment rule. In Casey v. Woodruff,58 for example,
involving a shareholders' derivative suit based on an unsuccessful
effort to obtain certain refinancing,5 9 the court noted:
When courts say that they will not interfere in matters of busi-
ness judgment, it is presupposed that judgment-reasonable dil-
igence-has in fact been exercised. A director cannot close his
eyes to what is going on about him in the conduct of the business
of the corporation and have it said that he is exercising business
judgment. Courts have properly decided to give directors a wide
latitude in the management of the affairs of a corporation pro-
vided always that judgment, and that means an honest, unbiased
judgment, is reasonably exercised by them.60
The American Law Institute recognized that many courts lib-
erally interpreted the reasonableness test when judging the con-
duct of corporate directors and officers. In 1992, the Institute
adopted a "rational belief" standard for purposes of protecting
55 Id.
56 Id. at 1000.
57 See, e.g., Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812 n.6 (indicating that there is "a long line of
Delaware cases hold[ing] that director liability is predicated on a standard which is
less exacting than simple negligence"); see also Penn Mart Realty Co. v. Becker, 298
A.2d 349, 351 (Del. 1972) (referring to gross negligence); Sinclair Oil Corp.v. Levien,
280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (employing fraud or gross negligence standard); Getty
Oil Co. v. Skelly Oil Co., 267 A.2d 883, 887 (Del. 1970) (referring to "gross and palpa-
ble overreaching"); Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966) (referring
to "bad faith" or "gross abuse of discretion"); Allaun v. Consolidated Oil Co., 147 A.
257, 261 (Del. Ch. 1929) (referring to "reckless indifference to or a deliberate disre-
gard of the ... stockholders").
58 49 N.Y.S.2d 625 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1944)
59 Id. at 629.
60 Id. at 643.
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business decisions made in good faith. Section 4.01(c) provides as
follows:
A director or officer who makes a business judgment in good faith
fulfills the duty under this Section if the director or officer:
1) is not interested in the subject of the business judgment;
2) is informed with respect to the subject of the business
judgment to the extent the director or officer reasonably be-
lieves to be appropriate under the circumstances; and
3) rationally believes that the business judgment is in the
best interests of the corporation.61
The rational belief standard for the judicial review of business
decisions is less stringent than other approaches. 62 The Corporate
Director's Guidebook, for example, refers to the business judgment
rule as applying only to a director who acts with a "reasonable
basis" for believing that the action was in the lawful and legiti-
mate furtherance of corporate purposes.63
The growth of legislation permitting waivers of specific duties
illustrates the trend towards limiting judicial interference with
private-sector corporate decision-making. These waiver provi-
61 ALI, supra note 38, § 4.01(c); see id. cmt. at 173 (indicating that "although
courts have not expressed it this way, business judgment rule has offered a safe har-
bor for directors or officers who make honest, informed business decisions that they
rationally believe are in the best interests of their corporations"). The term "ration-
ally believes" is described as having both an objective and a subjective content. A
director or officer must rationally believe that the business judgment is in the best
interest of the corporation. The test mirrors Delaware law. See Panter v. Marshall
Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.) (indicating that courts will not disturb busi-
ness judgment if "any rational business purpose can be attributed to (a director's]
decisions") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981); see also Unocal
Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (embracing any rational
business purpose test); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)
(applying rational business purpose test). The ALI comments to section 4.01(c)
indicate:
Sound public policy dictates that directors and officers be given greater pro-
tection than courts and commentators using a "reasonableness" test would
afford. Indeed, some courts and commentators, even when using a "reasona-
bleness" test, have expressly indicated that they do not intend that business
judgments be given the rigorous review that the word "reasonable" may be
read to imply.
ALI, supra note 38, § 4.01(c) cmt. at 180; see Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp.,
582 F.2d 259, 275 (3d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1129 (1979). In Cramer, the
court used the word reasonable, but concluded that directors' judgments must be "so
unwise or unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of the directors'
sound discretion" before the business judgment rule would become inapplicable. Id.
62 ALI, supra note 38, § 4.01(c) cmt., at 180.
63 ALI, supra note 38, § 4.01(c) cmt., at 180.
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sions followed in the wake of Smith v. Van Gorkom,64 a decision in
which directors were found personally liable for gross negligence
because they failed to keep themselves informed of a merger
transaction.65 As the cost of directors' and officers' liability insur-
ance increased and its availability decreased, a legislative means
of limiting director liability became necessary.66
The Delaware waiver provision eliminates or limits liability
to the stockholders for monetary damages for a director's breach
of a fiduciary duty. Such waivers are not permitted with respect
to the duty of loyalty, acts or omissions not performed in good
faith or that involve criminal or intentional misconduct, or when
an improper personal benefit is derived. Other states such as
Pennsylvania,6' New Jersey,69 Ohio,70  and Virginia 71 have
adopted various waiver provisions.
Thus, while there are some cases which reflect increased judi-
cial oversight of the standard of care of directors and officers, the
current trend lowers or otherwise contractually limits the legal
standards that govern the conduct of directors and officers. This
trend is illustrated by the deferential judicial interpretation of the
business judgment rule, by the "rational basis" standard em-
braced by the American Law Institute, and by the proliferation of
waiver provisions regarding the duty of care.
C. Partnership Model for General Partnerships: The Fiduciary
Duty of Loyalty and Standards of Care
Traditionally, partners have been described as standing in a
fiduciary relationship with one another.72 To what extent should
64 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
65 Id. Several other decisions reflect a more aggressive judicial stance. See
Edelman v. Fruehauf Corp., 798 F.2d 882 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding actions of board
unreasonable); Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264, 274 (2d
Cir. 1986) (noting when methodologies directors employed are so shallow in scope that
they are not shielded by business judgment rule); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews &
Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1985) (holding directors breached duty
of care).
66 See Gelb, supra note 37, at 13 (discussing waiver provisions and flood of legisla-
tion aimed at giving directors relief for breach of duty of care).
67 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1991).
68 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1713 (1993).
69 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:2-7(3) (West Supp. 1993).
70 Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson 1992).
71 VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-692.1 (Michie 1993).
72 See ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RmSTEN, BROMBERG & RmSTEIN ON PART-
NERsHIP 6:67 (1992); see also Beveridge, supra note 21 (discussing duty of care of part-
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limited liability company members be treated as partners and
subject to standards of conduct appropriate to partners? The legal
duties among partners reflect the duties owed by an agent to his
principal.73 Indeed, partnership duties and obligations have their
roots in the law of agency.74 Legal duties owed by one partner to
another broadly include: (1) a fiduciary duty of loyalty and utmost
good faith;75 (2) a duty to refrain from self-dealing; 76 (3) a duty to
avoid usurping partnership assets for personal use;77 and (4) a
duty to avoid usurping partnership opportunities. 7s
The seminal case on the fiduciary duty of partners is Mein-
hard v. Salmon,79 in which Justice Cardozo eloquently stated that
"[j]oint adventurers, like copartners, owe to one another.., the
duty of the finest loyalty .... Not honesty alone, but the punctilio
of an honor the most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior." 0
In Salhinger v. Salhinger,8 1 an earlier case, the court dramatically
articulated the fiduciary duties of partners. The case involved two
brothers who were partners.8 2 One brother, in an attempt to
"squeeze out" the other, incorporated the partnership without giv-
ing the other an interest in the corporation. 83 The court observed:
[T]here is no stronger fiduciary relation known to the law than
that of a copartnership, where one man's property and property
rights are subject to a large extent to the control and administra-
tion of another .... Their mutual confidence is the life blood of
the concern. It is because they trust one another that they are
ners in connection with revision of Uniform Partnership Act); Donald J. Weidner,
Three Policy Decisions Animate Revision of Uniform Partnership Act, 46 Bus. LAw.
427, 459 (1991) (reviewing standard of care provisions in connection with revision of
Uniform Partnership Act and indicating that Drafting Committee had retained word
"fiduciary" because it found no reason to abandon traditional notion that partners are
fiduciaries).
73 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 459 ("[T]he law of partnerships reflects the
broader law of principal and agent, which states that every agent is a fiduciary."); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958) ("[R]ights and liabilities
of partners with respect to each other . . . are largely determined by agency
principles.").
74 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 14A cmt. a (1958).
75 See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 6:68.
76 See BROMBERG & RmsTEIN, supra note 72, at 6:73-75.
77 See BROMBERG & RiBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 6:75-77.
78 See BROMBERG & RiBsTEIN, supra note 72, at 6:77-83.
79 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
80 Id. at 546.





partners in the first instance. It is because they continue to trust
one another that the business goes on .... 84
The standard of care which partners owe one another, distinct
from the duty of loyalty, has been the subject of considerable con-
troversy among commentators and the judiciary alike.8 5 Some
courts have held that partners must act with due diligence.8 6
84 Id. at 237 (quoting PARSONS ON PARTNERSHIP, § 158 and n.2).
85 See, e.g., Weidner, supra note 72, at 465.
The Restatement position is that a paid agent is subject to a duty to the prin-
cipal to act with "standard care" and skill. The leading hornbook on partner-
ships, on the other hand, states that partners "are not subject to the ordi-
nary care standard applicable to a paid agent." Yet there are both old and
new statements that partners are subject to an ordinary care standard.
Writing in 1841, Mr. Justice Story opined that: "good faith, reasonable
skill and diligence, and the exercise of sound judgment and discretion, are
naturally, if not necessarily, implied from the very nature and character of
the relation of partnership."
Id. (citations omitted); see also Beveridge, supra note 21, at 756-60 (indicating that
English and American case law recognize ordinarily prudent person standard as well
as business judgment rule). Beveridge wrote his article in response to the proposal
that the Revised Uniform Partnership Act embrace a gross negligence standard
rather than a reasonable care standard. Id. at 754. Beveridge observed:
The 1988 edition of the leading text on partnership law states flatly that
a general partner is not liable for negligent management. It states the gen-
eral rule as follows:
"A partner may be held accountable not only for deliberately appropriat-
ing an unauthorized benefit, but also for poor management. Partners, how-
ever, are not subject to the ordinary care standard applicable to a paid agent.
Thus, the partner is not liable to the partnership for the whole burden of
losses caused by mere errors of judgment and failure to use ordinary skill
and care in the supervision and transaction of business."
If this were a correct statement of the law, it would pose a question as to
why partnership law, which is largely based on agency principles, took a
detour when it came to the duty of care. It is submitted, however, that this
statement of the law is not supported by the weight of authority and is no
more true today than when it was first made fifty years ago.
Id. at 755 (quoting BROMBERG & RmSTEiN, supra note 72, at 6:86).
More recently, in Rosenthal v. Rosenthal, 543 A.2d 348, 352 (Me. 1988), the
Supreme Court of Maine held that partners owed each other four specific fiduciary
duties including the duty to act with that degree of diligence, care, and skill which
ordinarily prudent persons would exercise under similar circumstances in like posi-
tions. Id. The court embraced the business judgment rule, indicating that the busi-
ness judgment rule would insulate a partner from liability where informed business
decisions were made, unless there is a showing of harmful conduct which was primar-
ily motivated by fraud or bad faith. Id. at 353. However, there are a number of cases
which reject the view that partners owe each other the duty to act reasonably. See
infra note 86 and accompanying text.
86 See Rosenthal, 543 A.2d at 352 (indicating that partners must act with degree
of diligence, care, and skill which ordinarily prudent persons would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions); see also United Brokers' Co. v. Dose, 22 P.2d
204, 205 (Or. 1933) (indicating "the law of partnership is the law of agency").
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Since agency and partnership law are interwoven, there is au-
thority for the view that partners must act with standard care and
skill.8  However, a leading hornbook on partnerships generally
indicates that partners are not subject to the ordinary care stan-
dard.88 In fact, a number of courts have held that partners are not
liable to each other for ordinary negligence.89 This view was en-
dorsed by Judge Posner in a suit by a retired attorney against his
former partners for negligence in the operation of the firm.90
87 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379 (1958). "Unless otherwise agreed,
a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal to act with standard care and with
the skill which is standard in the locality for the kind of work which he is employed to
perform and, in addition, to exercise any special skill that he has." Id; see also Weid-
ner, supra note 72 at nn.108-17 (stating that partners are subject to ordinary care
standard).
88 See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, supra note 72, at 6:85. Partners, however, are not
subject to the ordinary care standard applicable to a paid agent. Thus, the partner is
not liable to the partnership for the whole burden of losses caused by mere errors of
judgment and failure to use ordinary skill and care in the supervision and transaction
of business. Id.
89 See Johnson v. Weber, 803 P.2d 939, 941 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (holding as mat-
ter of law that negligent management of general partnership or joint venture's affairs
does not create right of action against one partner by other members of partnership in
absence of breach of trust); Kartage v. Interocean, 167 So. 2d 76, 76 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1964) (holding that one member of joint venture is not liable to other for mere
negligence); Frates v. Nichols, 167 So.2d 77, 77 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (holding
that one member of joint venture not liable to another for ordinary negligence); Borys
v. Rudd, 566 N.E.2d 310, 316 (Ill. App. Ct.) (holding that partnership losses occa-
sioned by partner's poor judgment or mistakes of judgment will be borne by partner-
ship so long as decision does not involve fraud, illegality, or conflict of interest) modi-
fied, 575 N.E.2d 911 (Ill. 1991); Snell v. DeLand, 27 N.E. 183, 184 (Ill. 1891) (holding
that managing partner is not to be treated as insurer and can only be liable for loss
from willful disregard of duty); Horter v. Larrabee, 112 N.E. 613, 614 (Mass. 1916)
(indicating that one partner's error-ridden accounting system did not make him liable
to his partner since there is no liability of one partner to another for errors of judg-
ment not amounting to fraud, bad faith, or reckless disregard of obligations); Thomas
v. Milfelt, 222 S.W.2d 359, 365 (Mo. Ct. App. 1949) (indicating in suit for accounting
that partnership losses occasioned by conduct or poor judgment of one partner will not
be charged against him, but will be borne by firm, in absence of fraud, culpable negli-
gence, or bad faith); see also Knipe v. Livingston, 57 A.2d 1130 (Pa. 1904) (indicating
that one partner's unscientific method of bookkeeping was caused by error of judg-
ment, not by fraud and was not actionable); Duffy v. Piazza, 815 P.2d 267, 268 (Wash.
Ct. App. 1991) (indicating that generally there is no liability of one partner to another
for negligence in management of joint venture).
90 See Bane v. Ferguson, 890 F.2d 11 (7th Cir. 1989). In Bane, Judge Posner
stated:
We can find no precedent in Illinois law or elsewhere for imposing tort liabil-
ity on careless managers for the financial consequences of the collapse of the
firm to all who are hurt by that collapse. "The act of dissolution of a corpora-
tion is not in itself sufficient foundation for [a] tort action even if it results in
the breach of contracts...." The dissolution of a firm is a loss to some but a
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Given these inconsistencies, it is not surprising that Donald J.
Weidner, Reporter for the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, has
indicated that a mixed statement in the law exists concerning the
duty of care owed among partners. 91
D. Rejection of Broad Statements of Partner's Fiduciary Duties
by Revised Uniform Partnership Act
The Uniform Partnership Act ("UPA"), enacted in 1914, incor-
porates express duties of loyalty.92 However, the UPA contains no
duty of care provision.93 In contrast, the Revised Uniform Part-
nership Act ("RUPA") contains three major guidelines that govern
the conduct of partners including: (1) fiduciary duties specifically
limited to conduct expressly enumerated;9 4 (2) a standard of care
gain to others-competitors and their employees, suppliers, and other de-
pendents. Unless the gainers can be forced to disgorge their gains-and
they cannot-full liability to the losers will result in overdeterrence.
Id. at 14 (quoting Swager v. Couri, 376 N.E.2d 456, 459 (Ill. 1978).
91 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 465.
92 See UNiF. PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18(e), 19 (1916). These sections provide that
"[all partners have equal rights in the management and conduct of the partnership
business," and that every partner has a right to inspect and copy partnership books.
Id. Section 20 of the U.P.A. provides that "[p]artners shall render on demand true
and full information." Section 21(1) of the U.P.A. provides that "[e]very partner must
account to the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits de-
rived without consent of the other partners .... "
93 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 456.
94 Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 404 (1992). This section provides:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a partner owes to the partnership and the other
partners are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in this section.
(b) A partner's duty of loyalty to the partnership and the other partners is
limited to the following:
(1) to account to the partnership and hold as trustee for it any property,
profit, or benefit derived by the partner in the conduct and winding up of
the partnership business or derived from a use or appropriation by the
partner of partnership property or opportunity without the consent of
the other partners;
(2) to refrain from dealing with the partnership in the conduct or wind-
ing up of the partnership business, as or on behalf of a party having an
interest adverse to the partnership, without the consent of the other
partners; and
(3) to refrain from competing with the partnership in the conduct of the
partnership business before the dissolution of the partnership without
the consent of the other partners.
(c) A partner's duty of loyalty may not be eliminated by agreement, but the
partners by agreement may identify specific types or categories of activities
that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable.
(d) A partner's duty of care to the partnership and the other partners in the
conduct and winding up of the partnership business is limited to refraining
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that is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or
reckless conduct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of
law;95 and (3) an obligation of good faith and fair dealing.96 The
duty of loyalty and the obligation of good faith and fair dealing
may not be eliminated by agreement. However, if the agreement
is not manifestly unreasonable, the partner may agree to identify
specific types of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty.97
The standards of conduct indeed "reflect[ ] the supremacy of
the partnership agreement and minimize mandatory rules among
partners."9 8 By limiting fiduciary duties to those expressly enu-
merated, RUPA turns away from the broad statements of fiduci-
ary duty long embraced by courts.99 Rather, it incorporates con-
tract law by echoing the UCC's standard of good faith and fair
dealing. 100 Moreover, by adopting a gross negligence standard,
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional miscon-
duct, or a knowing violation of law.
(e) A partner shall discharge the duties to the partnership and the other
partners under this [Act] or under the partnership agreement and exercise
any rights consistently with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.
The obligation of good faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated in the
agreement, but the partners by agreement may determine the standards by
which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards
are not manifestly unreasonable ....
A partner may lend money to and transact other business with the part-
nership. The rights and obligations of a partner who lends money to or
transacts business with the partnership are the same as those of a person
who is not a partner, subject to other applicable law.
(g) This section applies to a person winding up the partnership business as
the personal or legal representative of the last surviving partner as if the
person were a partner.
Id.
95 Id. § 404(d).
96 Id. § 404(e).
97 Id. § 404(e), (c).
98 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 428.
99 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 462.
[V]ague broad statements of a powerful duty of loyalty cause too much un-
certainty. It was suggested that, even if there are no bad holdings, overly
broad judicial language has left practitioners uncertain about whether their
negotiated agreements will be voided. It was said that attorneys and their
clients want to be able to negotiate transactions, reduce their agreements to
writing, and have some comfort that those agreements will not be undone by
"fuzzy" notions of fiduciary duties.
Id.
100 See Rev. Unif. Partnership Act § 404 cmt. 1992. "The obligation of good faith
and fair dealing is a contract concept, imposed on the partners by virtue of the part-
nership agreement. It is not a fiduciary duty arising out of the partners' special rela-
tionship." Id.
STANDARDS OF CONDUCT
RUPA appears to adopt a standard of conduct which is lower than
some courts have employed, particularly in the context of disputes
between general and limited partners. 10 1
E. Limited Partnership Model
Some states have modeled limited liability company legisla-
tion after existing limited partnership statutes.10 2 The extent to
which limited partnership statutory language is useful with re-
spect to the development of viable standards of conduct for mem-
bers of the limited liability company is unclear. Limited partner-
ship statutes provide little express guidance regarding standards
of conduct. From a statutory standpoint, the standards of conduct
applicable to limited partnerships are the same as those applica-
ble to general partnerships. A review of the case law, however,
indicates a judicial willingness to protect limited partners from
abuse by managing partners. Case law resulting from suits by
limited partners against managing partners highlights problems
which may be encountered by active and passive members of com-
panies, as well as disputes between members and managers.
In 1916, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws promulgated the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act ("ULPA"). 10 3 ULPA was subsequently amended in 1976104
and again in 1985,105 and is now commonly referred to as the Re-
vised Uniform Limited Partnership Act ("RULPA").
ULPA generally imposes the same rights and powers on the
general partner as are imposed on a general partnership without
a limited partner.10 6 Thus, fiduciary duties owed by partners to
101 See infra note 112.
102 Compare DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 18-101 to -1106 (1993) (Limited Liability
Company Act) with DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to -1109 (1993) (Limited
Partnerships).
103 See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (1916).
104 See UNiP. LIrITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (1976); REv. UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
AcT (1985) historical note.
105 See Rev. Unif. Limited Partnership Act (1985).
106 See UiwUF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 9 (1916) providing:
(1) A general partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to
all the restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without lim-
ited partners, except that without the written consent or ratification of the
specific act by all the limited partners, a general partner or all of the general
partners have no authority to:
(a) Do any act in contravention of the certificate,
(b) Do any act which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary
business of the partnership,
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one another apply equally to limited partnerships. As the
Supreme Court of Washington noted, "[u]nder the Washington
Uniform Limited Partnership Act, the general partner has all the
rights and powers, and is subject to all the restrictions and liabili-
ties, of a partner in a partnership without limited partners. He is
therefore accountable to the limited partners as a fiduciary."1°7
RULPA contains similar language pertaining to the rights
and powers of the general partner.108 However, RULPA qualifies
this language by stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided in
this [Act] or in the partnership agreement, a general partner of a
limited partnership has the rights and powers and is subject to
the restrictions of a partner in a partnership without limited part-
ners."10 9 Further, RULPA expands the rights of limited partners
by permitting a limited partner to institute a derivative action. 10
In interpreting the fiduciary duties of general partners in lim-
ited partnerships, there is authority supporting the view that gen-
eral partners owe a greater fiduciary duty to limited partners who
(c) Confess a judgment against the partnership,
(d) Possess partnership property, or assign their rights in specific part-
nership property, for other than a partnership purpose,
(e) Admit a person as a general partner,
() Admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right to do so is
given in the certificate,
(g) Continue the business with partnership property on the death, re-
tirement or insanity of a general partner, unless the right so to do is
given in the certificate.
Id.
107 Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233, 236 (Wash. 1974); see DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-403 (1993).
(a) Except as provided in this chapter or in the partnership agreement, a
general partner of a limited partnership has the rights and powers and is
subject to the restrictions of a partner in a partnership without limited
partners.
(b) Except as provided in this chapter, a general partner of a limited part-
nership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited part-
ners to persons other than the partnership and the other partners. Except
as provided in this chapter or in the partnership agreement, a general part-
ner of a limited partnership has the liabilities of a partner in a partnership
without limited partners to the partnership and to the other partners.
Id.
108 See UNIF. LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AcT § 403 (1976) (including 1985 amend-
ments).
109 Id.
110 Id. § 1001. Section 1001 provides: "A limited partner may bring an action in
the right of a limited partnership to recover a judgment in its favor if general partners
... have refused... or if an effort to cause those general partners to bring the action
is not likely to succeed." Id.
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do not participate in management than to partners who actively
participate."' Numerous cases demonstrate the potential for
abuse by general partners and illustrate the active posture which
courts have taken in protecting the rights of limited partners.
1 2
111 See Weidner, supra note 73, at 467 n.118 ("There is authority for the general
proposition that general partners owe greater fiduciary duties to limited partners who
do not participate in management.") (citing Boley v. Pineloch Ass'n, Ltd., Fed. Sec. L.
Rep. (CCH) 95, 407, 1990 U.S. Dist. Lexis 9912 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)).
112 Some courts have refused to apply the business judgment rule or any other
grounds which might insulate general partners from negligence actions brought by
limited partners. See Curley v. Brignoli Curley & Roberts Assocs., 746 F. Supp. 1208,
1220 (S.D.N.Y. 1989), aff'd, 915 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1990). In Curley, the court applied
Delaware law and ruled that a provision in the partnership agreement which ex-
empted general partners from liability for conduct performed in "good faith" and
within the general partner's scope of authority would not preclude limited partners
from recovering against the general partner for misconduct that was merely negli-
gent. Id.; see also Roper v. Thomas, 298 S.E.2d 424,429 (N.C. Ct. App. 1982) (holding
that general partners were negligent in performance of partnership agreement and
rejecting defendant's argument that general partners' conduct should be protected by
business judgment rule); Shin v. Thrust IV, Inc., 786 P.2d 285, 290 (Wash. Ct. App.
1990) (refusing to apply business judgment rule to conduct of general partner). But
see Wyler v. Feuer, 149 Cal. Rptr 626, 633 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979) (applying business
judgment rule to insulate limited partners).
Many courts have recognized the particular vulnerability of limited partners and
have assumed an active posture in protecting limited partners. See, e.g., Tucker
Anthony Realty Corp. v. Schlesinger, 888 F.2d 969, 972 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that
general partners were bound by 'an 'inflexible' rule of fidelity that excludes not only
patent self-dealing, but insists on the avoidance of situations where the fiduciary's
own interest brings into question the interests of those to whom he owes a duty of
undiluted loyalty."); see also Birnbaum v. Birnbaum, 539 N.E.2d 574, 575 (N.Y. 1989)
(holding that general partner violated fiduciary duties by hiring his girlfriend to de-
velop partnership property without consent of his co-partners); Sherman v. Lloyd, III,
226 Cal. Rptr. 495, 498 (Cal. Ct. App. 1986) (illustrating need for strong judicial inter-
vention in case where general partners failed to inform limited partners that pro-
posed undertaking violated California law); M.D. Building Material Co. v. 910 Constr.
Venture, 579 N.E.2d 1059, 1062-63 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991) ("The passive nature of the
limited partner's role has often resulted in mismanagement and self-dealing by gen-
eral partners."); Labovitz v. Dolan, 545 N.E.2d 304, 310 (Ill. Ct. App. 1989) (holding
that although partnership agreement provided general partner with sole discretion
regarding distribution of earnings and limited general partner's liability to gross neg-
ligence, this language did not curtail general partner's fiduciary duties to limited
partners); Wartski v. Bedford, 926 F.2d 11, 20 (1st Cir. 1991) (indicating that partner-
ship agreement cannot nullify fiduciary duty owed by partners and noting that "'ex-
culpatory provisions.., create no license to steal.'") (quoting Irwin v. West End Dev.
Co., 342 F. Supp. 687, 701 (D. Colo. 1972), rev'd in part on other grounds, 481 F.2d 34
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1158 (1974)); Glanzer v. St. Joseph Indian Sch., 438
N.W.2d 204, 211 (S.D. 1989) ("[Tlhe general partner, as a fiduciary, must walk a
moral path above that tread by other members of the economic marketplace ... [and]
thus shoulders a heavy burden."); Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 524 P.2d 233,
238 (Wash. 1974) (indicating that limited partners must be able to rely on highest
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An analysis of the relationships between limited and general
partners is useful in identifying potential problems confronting
the limited liability company. Certain businesses, such as real es-
tate ventures, high technology enterprises, oil and gas invest-
ments, investments in theatrical productions, and joint American
and foreign ventures have long been conducted in the form of the
limited partnership, but are suitable for operation in the form of
limited liability companies. The history of dissension occurring in
limited partnerships suggests that an active judicial posture is ap-
propriate with regard to limited liability companies to protect mi-
nority members and those members who do not actively partici-
pate in management.
F. Contractual Model
The contractual model imposes an obligation of good faith and
fair dealing. The Restatement (Second) of Contracts asserts that
every contract imposes on its parties an obligation of good faith
and fair dealing in its performance and enforcement. 113 The Uni-
form Commercial Code ("UCC") also embraces the same standard
of conduct. 11 4 This contractual model serves as yet another possi-
ble standard which could be incorporated into legislation gov-
erning the conduct of members and managers of the limited liabil-
ity company. The good faith and fair dealing standard is included
in the standards of conduct embraced by the Discussion Draft of
the Uniform Act." 5 In addressing this standard, the threshold
standard of conduct from general partner, since limited partner has no effective voice
in decision-making process).
There is emerging support for legislation enabling partners to contractually limit
their duties and liabilities. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 17-1101(c), (d) (1993)
(providing that state's policy is to give "maximum effect to the principle of freedom of
contract and to the enforceability of partnership agreements"). It provides that a gen-
eral partner who has legal duties and liabilities, including fiduciary duties, shall not
be liable to the limited partner or to another partner if the general partner acts in
good faith reliance on a provision in a partnership agreement. Id. Additionally, the
partnership agreement may expand or restrict a party's duties. Id.; see BROMBERG &
RIBSTEIN, supra note 72.
113 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981); see also Deborah A.
DeMott, Beyond Metaphor: An Analysis of Fiduciary Obligation, 1988 DuKE L.J. 879,
893 (discussing differences between parties' pre-agreement and post-agreement dis-
cretion due to obligation of good faith).
114 See U.C.C. § 1-203 (1992) ("Every contract or duty within this Act imposes an
obligation of good faith in its performance or enforcement.").
115 See infra note 163 and accompanying text (discussing standards of conduct for
members and managers under Model Act).
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questions are: (1) what does the obligation of good faith and fair
dealing mean as a practical matter? and (2) how does the good
faith and fair dealing standard differ, if at all, from obligations
referred to as fiduciary duties?
Professor John C. Coffee, Jr. has addressed the distinction be-
tween fiduciary duties and the good faith and fair dealing stan-
dard found in contract law with regard to responsibilities of mem-
bers of boards of directors. 116  Professor Coffee makes the
following observations: (1) section 2-103(1)(b) of the UCC defines
good faith as honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable
commercial standards;1 7 (2) the emphasis on reasonable stan-
dards seems to approximate the duty of care;11s and (3) "bad faith"
may be easier to define than good faith, recognizing Professor
Summers's observation that good faith is essentially an excluder
phrase without general meaning which serves to exclude a wide
range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.11 9 Coffee indicates that
six categories of bad faith are identified, including: "evasion of the
spirit of the deal, lack of diligence and slacking off, willfully ren-
dering only 'substantial' performance, abuse of power to specify
terms, abuse of a power to determine compliance and interference
with or failure to cooperate in the other party's performance."
120
In attempting to identify the fundamental distinction be-
tween fiduciary duty and the standard of good faith and fair deal-
ing, Professor Coffee explains:
Put simply, fiduciary law is deeply intertwined with notions of
morality and the desire to preserve a traditional form of relation-
ship .... In contract law, a discretion-exercising party may often
act in a self-interested fashion. Good faith and self-interested be-
havior are not mutually exclusive. Conversely, fiduciary duty's
requirement of undivided loyalty permits the fiduciary to con-
sider only the beneficiary's interests. Any unauthorized profit re-
ceived by the fiduciary must be surrendered to the beneficiary,
116 Coffee, supra note 37, at 1648.
117 Id. at 1654 n.158.
118 Id. at 1654 n.159 (citing several cases which antedate UCC but provide gui-
dance on duty of care, including Pillois v. Billingsley, 179 F.2d 205, 207 (2d Cir. 1950);
M. O'Neil Supply Co. v. Petroleum Heat & Power Co., 280 N.Y. 50, 54, 19 N.E.2d 676,
678 (N.Y. 1939); Wigand v. Bachmann-Bechtel Brewing Co., 222 N.Y. 272, 277, 118
N.E. 618, 619 (N.Y. 1918)).
119 Coffee, supra note 37, at 1654 n.160 (citing Robert S. Summers, "Good Faith"
in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code,
54 VA. L. REv. 195, 201 (1968)).
120 Coffee, supra note 37, at 1654-55.
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even if the receipt in no way harms the beneficiary. In Judge
Cardozo's famous statement, the fiduciary is "held to something
stricter than the morals of the market-place." . . . This central
conceptual difference, that a contracting party may seek to ad-
vance his own interests in good faith while a fiduciary may not,
also helps explain a number of procedural differences between
the two duties. For example, the burden is on the fiduciary to
prove the fairness of any transaction .... Similarly, a party who
breaches a duty of good faith is liable for damages that are essen-
tially measured by the victim's losses, while fiduciaries are often
liable for the victim's losses plus their own gains .... 121
Professor Deborah A. DeMott also observes fundamental dis-
tinctions between fiduciary duties and the contractual standards
of good faith and fair dealing. 122 Professor DeMott notes that the
fiduciary's duty goes beyond mere fairness and honesty and obli-
gates the fiduciary to further the beneficiary's best interests. 23
DeMott writes:
In many relationships in which one party is bound by a fiduciary
obligation, the other party's vulnerability to the fiduciary's abuse
of power or influence conventionally justifies the imposition of fi-
duciary obligation. Much of contract law, in contrast, presup-
poses that "a contract is the result of the free bargaining of par-
ties who are brought together by the play of the market and who
meet each other on a footing of social and approximate economic
equality."12
4
Thus, primary differences between fiduciary duties and the
standard of good faith and fair dealing turn upon the ability to act
in a self-interested manner, the computation of damages, the pre-
sumption that the parties operate on an equal footing, and the
presence or absence of an imperative to further the beneficiary's
interests.
G. Agency
The Restatement (Second) of Agency provides that "[ulnless
otherwise agreed, a paid agent is subject to a duty to the principal
121 Coffee, supra note 37, at 1658.
122 See DeMott, supra note 113, at 880.
123 DeMott, supra note 113, at 882 n.11.
124 DeMott, supra note 113, at 902 (quoting Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-
Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 630 (1943)). De-
Mott acknowledged that there are doctrines within contract law which attempt to




to act with standard care and with the skill which is standard in
the locality for the kind of work which he is employed to perform,
and... to exercise any special skill that he has."'25 A due care
standard is consistent with the overall treatment of limited liabil-
ity company members and managers as agents. For example, a
number of states, such as Arizona, 126 Colorado, 127 Louisiana, 128
125 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 379(1) (1958).
126 ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-654 (Supp. 1993). This statute provides:
A. Unless the articles of organization of a limited liability company provide
that management is vested in one or more managers:
1. Each member is an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose
of carrying on its business in the usual way.
2. The act of each member, including the execution in the name of the lim-
ited liability company of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the
usual way the business of the limited liability company of which he is a
member binds the limited liability company unless the acting member has in
fact no authority to act for the limited liability company in the particular
matter and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact
that the member has no such authority.
Id.
127 COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-406 (West Supp. 1993). This section provides:
(4) Every manager is an agent of the limited liability company for the pur-
pose of its business, and the act of every manager, including the execution in
the limited liability company name of any instrument for apparently carry-
ing on in the usual way the business of the limited liability company of
which he is a manager, binds the limited liability company, unless such act
is in contravention of the articles of organization or the operating agreement
or unless the manager so acting otherwise lacks the authority to act for the
limited liability company and the person with whom he is dealing has knowl-
edge of the fact that he has no such authority.
Id.
128 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1317 (West Supp. 1994). The Louisiana revised stat-
ute provides:
A. Each member, if management is reserved to the members, or manager,
if management is vested in one or more managers pursuant to R.S. 12:1312,
is a mandatary of the limited liability company for all matters in the ordi-
nary course of its business other than the alienation, lease, or encumbrance
of its immovables, unless otherwise provided in the articles of organization
or this Chapter or unless such member or manager lacks the authority to act
for the limited liability company and the person with whom he is dealing has
knowledge of the fact that he lacks such authority.
B. Persons dealing with a member, if management is reserved to the mem-
bers, or manager, if management is vested in one or more managers pursu-
ant to R.S. 12:1312, of the limited liability company shall be deemed to have
knowledge ofrestrictions on the authority of such a member or manager con-
tained in a written operating agreement if the articles of organization of the
limited liability company contain a statement that such restriction exist.
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Maryland, 129 Oklahoma,130 and Texas, 131 expressly provide that
each member or manager acts as an agent of the limited liability
company. Many states go further and impose upon the member or
manager a duty to treat limited liability company property as if
the property were held by a trustee. 132 Thus, the conception of the
member as agent is an integral part of most limited liability com-
pany statutes.
H. Current Status of Limited Liability Company Legislation
Currently, forty-five states have limited liability statutes.133
Many other states have either entertained or are in the process of
reviewing proposed legislation.3 The enacted statutes contain di-
129 MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-401 (Michie 1993). The Maryland stat-
ute provides in part:
(a) In general-
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection or in the operating
agreement, each member is an agent of the limited liability company for the
purpose of its business.
(2) Except as provided in paragraph (3) of this subsection, the act of each
member, including the execution in the name of the limited liability com-
pany of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the limited liability company of which the person is a member,
binds the limited liability company, unless:
(i) the member so acting has in fact no authority to act for the limited
liability company in the particular matter; and
(ii) the person with whom the member is dealing has actual knowledge
of the fact that the member has no such authority.
Id.
130 OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2019 (West Supp. 1994). This section provides:
A. Every manager is an agent of the limited liability company for the pur-
pose of its business, and the act of every manager, including the execution in
the limited liability company name of any instrument for apparently carry-
ing on the business of the limited liability company of which he is a man-
ager, binds the limited liability company, unless the manager so acting lacks
the authority to act for the limited liability company in the particular matter
and the person with whom he is dealing has knowledge of the fact that he
has no such authority.
Id.
131 See TEx. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 1528n, § 2.21 (West Supp. 1994) (providing
for treatment of manager and officers as agents).
132 See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7619 (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.391 (Michie
1994); Wyo. STAT. § 17-15-121 (1993).
133 See supra note 1 (listing states which have enacted statutes authorizing lim-
ited liability companies).
134 See, e.g., Cal. S.B. 469, Reg. Sess. (1993) (introduced Feb. 25, 1993, pending as
of Jan. 26, 1994); Conn. H.B. 5268, Reg. Sess. (1993) (introduced Jan. 6, 1993); Conn.
H.B., 5442, Reg. Sess. (1993) (introduced Jan. 12, 1993); Haw. H.B. 777, 17th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1993) (introduced Jan. 22, 1993 and referred to Senate Committee on Ways and
Means on Apr. 13, 1993); Haw. H.B. 863, 17th Leg., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced Jan.
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verse approaches to standards of conduct among managers and
members of the limited liability company. The corporate, partner-
ship, or contractual models discussed above are employed, and in
some cases, a blended approach is utilized.
Delaware has taken the lead in deferring to the contract of
the parties to determine standards of conduct.135 A Delaware lim-
ited liability company may be managed by members or by manag-
ers. 136 However, no express standard of care is provided.
3 7
States such as Florida and Nevada yield to the contractual ar-
rangement as the source of standards of conduct.- 38 It is notewor-
thy, however, that although the Florida and Nevada statutes de-
fer to the contractual arrangement, they contain other important
provisions which relate to standards of conduct. In Florida, an in-
voluntary dissolution may be sought if the limited liability com-
pany has carried on, conducted, or transacted business in a per-
sistently fraudulent or illegal manner, or has abused its powers
contrary to the public policy. 3 9 Nevada provides indemnity for
managers, members, employees, and agents so long as the ques-
22, 1993 and referred to House Committees on Consumer Protection and Commerce
and Judiciary and Finance on Jan. 26, 1993); Haw. S.B. 263, 17th Leg., 1st Sess.
(1993) (introduced Jan. 26, 1993 and referred to Senate Committees on Consumer
Protection and Ways and Means on Jan. 22, 1993); Me. H.B. 1123, 116th Leg., 1st
Sess. (1993) (introduced May 17, 1993); Neb. L.B. 121, 93rd Leg., 1st Sess. (1993)
(enacted May 27, 1993); N.J. S.B. 890, 205th Leg. 2d Sess. (1993) (enacted June 17,
1993); N.Y. S.B. 27, 215th Gen. Ass., 2d Sess. (1993) (introduced Jan. 6, 1993,
amended and referred to Senate Committee on Corporations, Authorities and Com-
missions on Mar. 8, 1994); N.C. H.B. 923, 140th Gen. Ass. (1993) (ratified July 15,
1993); Or. S.B. 285, 67th Leg., Reg. Sess. (1993) (enacted June 24, 1993); Pa. H.B.
705, 176th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (introduced Mar. 16, 1993 and referred to House
Committee on Business and Economic Development on Mar. 22, 1993); Pa. S.B. 1059,
176th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1993) (introduced Apr. 29, 1993 and referred to Senate
Committee on Appropriations on June 7, 1993); R.I. H.B. 5891, Reg. Sess. (1993) (in-
troduced Feb. 23, 1993); R.I. S.B. 11, Reg. Sess. (1993) (enacted July 22, 1993); Tenn.
H.B. 952, 98th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1993) (introduced Feb. 15, 1993); Tenn. S.B. 554,
98th Gen. Ass., Reg. Sess. (1993) (introduced Feb. 3, 1993); Wash. H.B. 1235, 53rd
Leg., Reg. Sess. (1994) (ratified Mar. 4, 1994). As of December 31, 1993, Massachu-
setts, Ohio, South Carolina, and Wisconsin have pending LLC legislation.
135 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(B) (1993) ("It is the policy of this chapter to
give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceabil-
ity of limited liability company agreements.").
136 Id. § 18-402 (1993) ("The manager shall.., have the responsibilities.. . set
forth in a limited liability company agreement.").
137 Id.
138 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.422 (West Supp. 1994) (providing managers' responsi-
bilities according to operating agreement); NEv. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.291 (Michie
1994) (providing similar language).
139 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.448-1(d), (e) (West Supp. 1994).
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tioned conduct was in good faith, and the party reasonably be-
lieved the conduct was in, or not opposed to, the best interests of
the limited liability company. 140
With respect to the duties of managers of limited liability
companies, a number of states adopt the same standard of care
applied to corporations under the Model Business Corporation
Act. 141 Colorado,142 Minnesota, 143 Oklahoma,1 4 4 New York,145 Vir-
ginia,146 and West Virginia 147 adopted a standard of care for man-
agement based on an ordinarily prudent person in a like position
under similar circumstances. However, it is uncertain to what ex-
tent the business judgment rule may be invoked to insulate man-
agement decisions.
Some states appear to incorporate agency principles without
expressly providing for a standard of care based on agency con-
cepts.1 48 For example, Arizona essentially provides that members
140 NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 86.411, 86.421 (Michie 1994).
141 MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.30 (1984). This section provides that "a direc-
tor shall discharge his duties as a member of a committee: 1) in good faith; 2) with the
care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar cir-
cumstances; and 3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interest of the
corporation." Id.
142 See COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 7-80-410(2)(a) (West Supp. 1993) (providing for
indemnification of managers, employees, or agents if manager conducted himself in
good faith and with reasonable belief that his conduct was in best interests of limited
liability company).
143 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.69 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that manager
shall discharge his duties in good faith, in manner he reasonably believes to be in best
interest of limited liability company, and with care of ordinarily prudent person in
like position under similar circumstances).
144 See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 2016 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that manag-
ers shall discharge duties in good faith with care of ordinary prudent person in like
position under similar circumstances, and in manner reasonably believed to be in best
interest of limited liability company); Id. § 2015 (providing that members be treated
as managers in member-managed limited liability company).
145 N.Y. S.B. 27, 215th Gen. Ass., 1st Sess. (1993) (introduced on Jan. 6, 1993).
Section 409 of the proposed statute provides that a manager shall perform his or her
duties as a manager, including his or her duties as a member of any class of manag-
ers, in good faith and with that degree of care that an ordinarily prudent person
would use under similar circumstances. Id.
146 See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1024.1 (Michie 1993) (providing standards that
manager act in accordance with his good faith business judgment in best interest of
limited liability company).
147 See W. VA. CODE § 31-1A-33 (1993) (providing that members of limited liabil-
ity company shall have same rights and liabilities as shareholders of corporations and
managers shall have same rights and liabilities as directors of corporations).
148 See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
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or managers are agents of the limited liability company.1 49 Mary-
land15 0 and Texas 51 similarly incorprorate the agency concept.
Louisiana has a unique formulation of standards of conduct
which blends partnership, corporate, contractual, and agency
principles.'5 2 Virginia, while adopting a good faith and reason-
able conduct standard, also employs a limitation on the liability of
managers or members arising out of a single transaction, occur-
rence, or course of conduct.153 States such as Kansas15 4 and Wyo-
ming 55 are silent regarding the conduct of managers or members.
California has proposed legislation which closely parallels the
standards of conduct contained in RUPA.' 56 The California model
limits the fiduciary duties of a manager or member to the duties of
loyalty and care expressly provided in the statute.-5 7 The duty of
149 See ARiz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 29-654 (Supp. 1993) (providing that members are
agents of limited liability company for purpose of carrying on business in usual way).
150 See VID. CODE ANN. CoRPs. & Ass'Ns § 4A-401 (Michie 1993) ("[Ejach member
is an agent of the limited liability company for the purpose of its business.").
151 See TEx. Bus. CoRn. AcT ANN. art. 1528n-2.21C (West Supp. 1994) (designat-
ing every manager an agent of limited liability company).
152 See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12:1314(1) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that mem-
ber or manager stands in fiduciary relationship to limited liability company and shall
discharge his duties in good faith, with same diligence, care, judgment, and skill ordi-
nary prudent person in like position would exercise under similar circumstances and
in manner reasonably believed to be in best interest of limited liability company).
153 See VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1025 A. (Michie 1993). This statute provides:
A. [T]he damages assessed against a manager or member arising out of a
single transaction, occurrence or course of conduct shall not exceed the
lesser of: 1) The monetary amount, including the elimination ofliability...
of the manager or member; or 2) The greater of (i) $100,000 or (ii) the
amount of cash compensation received by the manager or member from the
limited liability company during the twelve months immediately preceding
the act or omission for which liability was imposed. B. The liability of a
manager or member shall not be limited as provided in this section to the
extent otherwise provided in writing in the articles of organization or an
operating agreement, or if the manager or member engaged in willful mis-
conduct or a knowing violation of the criminal law.
Id.
154 See KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 17-7601 to -7650 (1992).
155 See Wyo. STAT. §§ 17-15-101 to -136 (1993).
156 See Cal. S.B. 469, Reg. Sess., ch. 4 § 17153 (1993). The bill is suspended as of
April 15, 1993.
157 Id.
(a) The only fiduciary duties a manager, or a member acting in the capacity
of manager, owes to the limited liability company and its members are the
duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth in this section. (b) A manager's
duty of loyalty to the limited liability company and its members is limited to
the following: (1) To account to the limited liability company and hold as
trustee for it any property, profit, or benefit derived by the manager, without
the consent of the members, in the conduct and winding up of the limited
1994]
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loyalty is limited to the duty to account for profits as
a trustee, to refrain from dealing as or on behalf of an adverse
party, and to refrain from competition, absent the consent of the
members. 158 Significantly, the duty of loyalty may not be elimi-
nated by agreement, but an agreement may identify the types or
categories of activities that do not violate the duty of loyalty, if not
manifestly unreasonable. 159 The proposal prohibits the operating
agreement or the articles of organization from eliminating the
duty of care or the obligation of good faith and fair dealing.160
The California proposal does not set forth a standard of care
as distinguished from the duty of loyalty for members. However,
the proposal does provide a standard of care for managers.1 61 A
manager's duty of care is limited to refraining from engaging in
grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional or reckless con-
duct, intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.162
III. THE EMERGENCE OF A UNIFORM LIMITED LIABILITY
COMPANY ACT
Against the backdrop of the enactment of limited liability
company legislation in numerous states, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws appointed a study com-
mittee in late 1991 to determine whether the Conference should
liability company business or from a use or appropriation by the manager of
limited liability company property or opportunity. (2) To refrain from deal-
ing with the limited liability company in the conduct or winding up of the
limited liability company business, as or on behalf of a party having an inter-
est adverse to the limited liability company without the consent of the mem-
bers. (3) To refrain form competing with the limited liability company in the
conduct of the limited liability company business without the consent of the
members before the dissolution of the limited liability company. (c) A man-
ager's duty of loyalty may not be eliminated by agreement, but the members
may by agreement identify specific types or categories of activities that do
not violate the duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable. (d) A man-
ager's duty of care to the limited liability company and its members in the
conduct and winding up of the limited liability company business is limited
to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, inten-
tional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.
Id.
158 Id. § 17153(b)(1)-(3).
159 Id. § 17153(c).
160 Id. § 17005(b)(7), (8).
161 Id. § 17153(d).
162 Id.
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undertake a drafting project on limited liability companies. 163 The
study committee believed that the diversity in state law would ul-
timately impede the predictability and utility of limited liability
company business.16 4 A drafting committee was appointed and
drafting sessions are currently in progress.'
65
The Discussion Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability Com-
pany Act uses RUPA as a starting point. The Uniform Act places
a premium on the contract between the parties. Although the
standard of loyalty may not be eliminated, it may be modified by
agreement. Broadly phrased statements of fiduciary duties are
avoided and are replaced with a contractually based standard of
good faith and fair dealing. The Uniform Act departs from the
standard of due care imposed upon agency relationships. In its
place, it embraces the lesser standard of gross negligence, unless a
higher standard of care is provided in the agreement.
The Discussion Draft includes general standards of conduct
for members and managers. The statutory language closely fol-
lows the language of RUPA. The only fiduciary duties a member
owes to the limited liability company and other members are the
duties of loyalty and care specifically contained in Section 408.166
163 See UNnF. LIMITED LIABILITY CoiPANY AoT, Prefatory Notes & Comments
(Discussion Draft 1993). The drafting committee's first drafting session was in Den-




166 Id. § 408. Section 408 provides:
(a) The only fiduciary duties a member owes to the limited liability company
and the other members are the duty of loyalty and the duty of care set forth
in this section. (b) A member's duty of loyalty to the limited liability com-
pany and the other members is limited to the following: (1) To account to the
limited liability company and hold as trustee for it any property, profit, or
benefit derived by the member, without the consent of the other members, in
the conduct and winding up of the limited liability company business or from
a use or appropriation by the member of limited liability company property
or opportunity; (2) To refrain from dealing with the limited liability company
in the conduct or winding up of the limited liability company business, as or
on behalf of a party having an interest adverse to the limited liability com-
pany without the consent of the other members; and (3) To refrain from com-
peting with the limited liability company in the conduct of the limited liabil-
ity company business without the consent of the other members before the
dissolution of the limited liability company. (c) A member's duty of loyalty
may not be eliminated by agreement, but the member control agreement
may identify specific types or categories of activities that do not violate the
duty of loyalty, if not manifestly unreasonable. (d) A member's duty of care
to the limited liability company and the other members in the conduct and
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A member's duty of loyalty is limited to a duty to account to the
company, to hold as trustee any property or profit without the con-
sent of the members,167 to refrain from dealing with, as, or on be-
half of a party having an interest adverse to the company without
the consent of the other members,1 68 and to refrain from compet-
ing without the consent of the members.1 69 Like the California
proposal, the Discussion Draft provides that the duty of loyalty
may not be eliminated by agreement, but, if not manifestly unrea-
sonable, the member control agreement may identify specific
types or categories of activities that do not violate the duty of
loyalty.1 7 0
The duty of care applicable to both members and managers is
limited to liability for grossly negligent or reckless conduct, inten-
tional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law.17 1 The com-
ments to the Uniform Act do not elaborate on this standard. Iden-
tical language, however, is contained in section 404(d) of RUPA.172
The comments provide insight into the rationale for the adoption
of the gross negligence standard in the limited liability company
winding up of the limited liability company business is limited to refraining
from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, intentional miscon-
duct, or a knowing violation of law. (e) A member shall discharge the duties
to the limited liability company and the other members under this [Act] or
under the limited liability company agreement, and exercise any rights, con-
sistent with the obligation of good faith and fair dealing. The obligation of
good faith and fair dealing may not be eliminated by agreement, but the
members may by the member control agreement determine the standards by
which the performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards
are not manifestly unreasonable. (f) A member does not violate a duty or
obligation under this [Act] or under the limited liability company agreement
merely because the member's conduct furthers the member's own interest.
A member may lend money to and transact other business with the limited
liability company. The rights and obligations of a member who lends money
to or transacts business with the limited liability company are the same as
those of a person who is not a member, subject to other applicable law. (g)
This section applies to a person winding up the limited liability company
business as the personal or legal representative of the last surviving mem-
ber as if the person were a member. (h) Where the management of a limited
liability company is vested in managers rather than members, the managers
shall be held to the same standards of conduct set forth in subsections (b)
through (f).
Id.
167 Id. § 408(b)(1).
168 Id. § 408(b)(2).
169 Id. § 408(b)(3).
170 Id. § 408(c).
171 Id. § 408(d), (h).
172 See UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 404(d), 6 U.L.A. 228 (1992 Supp.).
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context.' 7 3 These comments indicate that the standard of gross
negligence is used in many partnership agreements today. 174
Although absolving partners of intentional misconduct is consid-
ered per se unreasonable, 75 it is left to the courts to determine
the outer limit in reducing the standard of care.17 6
Like RUPA, the Uniform Act imposes an obligation of good
faith and fair dealing. 7 7 Similarly, the duty of good faith and fair
dealing may not be eliminated by agreement, although the mem-
ber control agreement may delineate the standards by which the
performance of the obligation is to be measured, if the standards
are not manifestly unreasonable. 7 8 The comments to RUPA are
again instructive, observing that the obligation of good faith and
fair dealing is a contract concept.' 7 9 Reference is made to the
UCC, and to Summers's explanation as follows:
Good faith, as judges generally use the term in matters contrac-
tual, is best understood as an "excluder"-a phrase with no gen-
eral meaning or meanings of its own. Instead, it functions to rule
out many different forms of bad faith. It is hard to get this point
across to persons used to thinking that every word must have
one or more general meanings of its own-must be either univo-
cal or ambiguous.18 0
Thus, the Discussion Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act does not completely jettison fiduciary duties nor to-
tally defer to the agreement between the parties. It represents a
compromise position that permits some contractual specification
of the duties of loyalty and good faith, yet prohibits wholesale opt-
ing out of traditional fiduciary duties.
IV. A FRESH APPROACH TO THE STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR
THE LIMITED LIABILITY CoMPANY
What standards of conduct are most appropriate for members
and managers of the limited liability company? Should a




177 Compare RUPA § 404(e) with UNF. LIMITED LIABILITY ComPANY AcT § 408(e)
(Discussion Draft 1993).
178 RUPA § 404(e); UriF. LIMITED LIABILITY ComPANY ACT § 408(e) (Discussion
Draft 1993).
179 See RUPA § 404 cmts.
180 Id.
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mandatory standard of due care be adopted? Should Delaware's
lead be followed permitting virtually complete deference to the
contract between the parties? Alternatively, has the Discussion
Draft of the Uniform Act achieved a viable balance between
mandatory standards on one hand, and self-regulating, contrac-
tual standards on the other?
To begin to answer these questions, each model must be ana-
lyzed in light of the underlying social policy considerations and
the realities of doing business in the form of the limited liability
company.
A. Social Policy Considerations
Establishing the appropriate duties of loyalty and standard of
care for limited liability company members and managers re-
quires consideration of several competing policy issues, including:
(1) The utility of maintaining flexibility of organization and free-
dom of contract; (2) the desire for members to obtain a reasonable
degree of certainty as to responsibilities; (3) the goal of encourag-
ing risk taking and entrepreneurial undertakings; (4) the impor-
tance of providing standards which will encourage responsible be-
havior toward other limited liability company members, and in
particular, to minority members and to members who do not ac-
tively participate; and (5) the business's responsibility to the pub-
lic at large. Models for conduct should be evaluated against the
backdrop of such social policy goals.
B. The Failure of the Traditional Corporate Model to Address
the Needs of Closely Held Businesses
It is irrefutable that both the due care standard for directors
and the business judgment rule are expressly designed to en-
courage risk taking, innovation, and entrepreneurial activities by
refusing to permit courts to second-guess business decisions.18 1
Although these goals are also present in the case of businesses
conducted in the form of the limited liability company, the corpo-
rate standard of due care, when combined with an expansive ap-
plication of the business judgment rule, is inappropriate in the
limited liability company context.
There are fundamental structural differences between the
public corporation and the limited liability company. First, in a
181 See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
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member-managed limited liability company there is no separation
between ownership and management. In contrast, the corporate
form presupposes a separation between ownership and manage-
ment.8 2 The board of directors has no true counterpart in the
limited liability company.18 3 The corporation possesses a board of
directors which, in an oversight capacity, collectively engages in
group decision-making. 184 Conversely, the decision-making pro-
cess in the limited liability company context is largely informal' 8 5
and involves the hands-on, day-to-day conduct of business.
182 This separation does not exist in close corporations, and is one of the reasons
why remedial legislation has been needed to address the special needs of the close
corporation. See O'Neal, supra note 17, at 884 (indicating that participants in close
corporations do not usually think of themselves as delegating management of their
corporation to independent board of directors).
183 See supra note 25 (indicating that most limited liability company statutes pro-
vide for management by members or manager, with manager described as agent or
employee of limited liability company).
184 The collective nature of the decision-making of the Board of Directors is noted
by ALI, supra note 38, at 136, providing as follows:
[T]he business judgments of the Board of directors or of a committee are not
decisions of individuals, and since oversight obligations rest on the board as
a whole (see sec. 3.02(a)(2)), difficult causation issues will often arise. When
Part IV states that a director or officer has "committed a breach" of the duty
of care, no implication is intended that liability will be imposed. That ques-
tion depends on whether the acts or omissions were the legal cause of any
damage to the corporation.
Id.; see §§ 4.01(d), 7.18. A director who fails to perform an oversight obligation, for
example, may have caused no damage to the corporation because the failure was ren-
dered harmless by the care of other directors. See also Statement of the Business
Roundtable, The Role and Composition of the Board of Directors of the Large Publicly
Owned Corporation, 33 Bus. LAw. 2083, 2096-2103 (1978) (stating that there are four
key board functions, including providing for management and board succession, con-
sidering decisions and actions with potential for major economic impact, considering
social impacts, and establishing policies and procedures to assure law compliance).
185 See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29-682.B.4 (Supp. 1993) (providing that op-
erating agreement may make provisions for any matter requiring vote, approval or
consent of members or managers, provisions relating to notice of time, place, and pur-
pose of any meeting at which matter is to be voted on, waiver of notice, action by
consent without meeting, establishment of record date, quorum requirements, autho-
rizations by proxy or any other matter concerning exercise of any voting or approval
rights); Id. § 29-683 (providing for approval of actions by written consent); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 16, § 18-302(c) (1993) (providing that limited liability company agreement
may set forth provisions relating to notice of time, place, or purpose of any meeting at
which any matter is to be voted on by any members, and to waiver of any such notice).
Some states impose minimal guidelines on meetings. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-
7613(b) (1992) (providing that operating agreement shall provide for meetings which
may be held at such times as provided in operating agreement or upon minimum of 10
days written notice).
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Limited liability companies are typically privately held enti-
ties.18 6 They resemble the close corporation more than the public
corporation upon which the traditional standards of care and the
business judgment rule are based. An investment in a limited lia-
bility company lacks liquidity to the extent that there is no public
market to dispose of the interest. Years of experience indicate
that the traditional corporate model is inadequate to meet the
needs of closely held corporations, and in particular, the needs of
minority owners of closely held business enterprises.1 8 7
Steven C. Bahls has observed that the two legal doctrines
which have historically served as barriers to removing inefficient
or incompetent management include the majority rule doctrine
and the business judgment rule."88 Bahls described the particular
difficulties of the minority shareholder in combating ineffective
majority control. He noted that:
186 I.R.C. § 7704 (1988) (providing for taxation of publicly traded corporations). If
a limited liability company were ever publicly traded the primary benefits of achiev-
ing taxation as a partnership coupled with limited liability would be lost. Therefore,
at present the limited liability company is a vehicle solely for privately owned
enterprises.
187 See Steven C. Bahls, Resolving Shareholder Dissension: Selection of the Ap-
propriate Equitable Remedy, 15 J. CoRP. L. 285 (1989) (reviewing illiquidity and
plight of minority shareholders, as well as legislative efforts to address dissension,
and proposing standards for determining appropriate remedies for shareholder dis-
sension); Victor B. Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354, 1357-70 (1978) (reviewing and classifying corporate
freezeouts of minority shareholders in public corporations, including discussion of go-
ing private transactions); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Close Corpora-
tions and Agency Costs, 38 STA. L. REV. 271 (1986) (reviewing cost and risk associ-
ated with management of close corporations and indicating that lack of liquidity
invites exploitation); Robert W. Hillman, The Dissatisfied Participant in the Solvent
Business Venture: A Consideration of the Relative Permanence of Partnerships and
Close Corporations, 67 MIN. L. REv. 1, 75 (1982) (reviewing partners' power to dis-
solve partnerships and shareholders' power to dissolve close corporations, and focus-
ing on importance of investor's expectations in close corporations); Richard A. Mann,
A Critical Analysis of the Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act, 22 AM. Bus. L.J. 289 (1984) (analyzing Statutory Close Corpora-
tion Supplement to Model Business Corporation Act, and indicating that while closely
held corporations comprise large majority of incorporated business entities in United
States, their special needs differ from those of larger public corporations and these
special needs have not, until recently, received statutory protection); O'Neal, supra
note 17, at 873-81 (analyzing legislation aimed at closely held corporations and indi-
cating inadequacy of traditional corporate standards when applied to close corpora-
tions); see also John E. Davidian, Corporate Dissolution in New York: Liberalizing the
Rights of Minority Shareholders, 56 ST. Jom's L. REv. 24 (1981) (reviewing develop-
ment of New York legislation enhancing rights of minority shareholders).
188 Bahls, supra note 187, at 292.
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Majority shareholders control the books and records of the com-
pany and have been known to alter them. Likewise, majority
shareholders, with the benefit of hindsight, and the Business
Judgment Rule, often recharacterize a questionable transaction
or find new and acceptable justifications for the transaction. As-
certaining whether the shareholder-manager ... has been bene-
fited is like putting Humpty Dumpty back together again. More-
over, even if a minority shareholder wins money damages, the
real root of the problem, the incompetent or dishonest controlling
shareholder, remains..
8 9
It is anticipated that a broad range of privately held busi-
nesses, including family businesses, will be conducted as limited
liability companies. 190 Difficulties in the relationships between
majority and minority limited liability company members and the
potential for dissension among members can be expected. 191
Given the similarities between the limited liability company
and the closely held corporation, legal standards of conduct gov-
erning limited liability company members and managers must be
tailored to address the problems that have traditionally plagued
closely held businesses. The hands-off judicial posture which the
business judgment rule supports is not suitable for privately held
189 Bahls, supra note 187, at 293 (citations omitted).
190 See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
191 The magnitude of dissension in family businesses should not be underesti-
mated. See Bahis, supra note 187, at 287.
Close corporations account for most of American business. Family
owned businesses alone represent ninety-five percent of all United States
businesses and are responsible for nearly fifty percent of the jobs in the
United States. However, in a study by Professor John L. Ward of Loyola
University of Chicago, eighty percent of the Chicago area family-owned cor-
porations that were in existence in 1924 and had at least twenty employees
were no longer going concerns in 1984. Some of the major reasons for the
business failure of closely held businesses are "typical family problems
[such] as sibling rivalry [and] competition between the generations," that
result in shareholder dissension and corporate succession problems. Costs
associated with dissension include ineffective use of management time, re-
source-draining litigation, loss of a business's ability to obtain necessary fi-
nancing, as well as the obvious costs associated with business failure.
Dissension within a company produces noneconomic losses as well. If
allowed to escalate, it can destroy sound family relationships and lead to
vindictiveness. In one sense, dissension in close corporations is like dissen-
sion in a marriage. In both circumstances, complex emotional and financial
relationships exist that courts cannot easily dissolve without losses. Just as
courts have developed standards in dissolution of the marital relationship to
minimize hardship, courts also must develop standards to resolve dissension
in close corporations.
Id. (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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businesses, whether in the form of a corporation or a limited lia-
bility company. The current trend in corporate law is to insulate
directors from liability through waiver provisions designed to per-
mit waivers of specified duties1 92 and through a dilution of the
standard of care for judicial review of business judgments from a
"reasonableness" standard to a "rational belief" standard. 193 The
resulting standards may well serve to encourage individuals to
participate as members of boards of directors of public corpora-
tions; however, they fail to provide a viable approach in the arena
of closely held businesses.
C. Advantages and Shortcomings of the Traditional
Partnership Model
The similarities between partnerships and limited liability
companies make the partnership model for standards of conduct a
logical choice for the limited liability company.1 94 It is not sur-
prising that the Discussion Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability
Company Act is based on a partnership paradigm. The fiduciary
duties long associated with partnerships would work well to pro-
tect all members of the limited liability company, and in particu-
lar, minority members and members who do not actively partici-
pate in management. The issue becomes which partnership
standards should be adopted.
The adoption of traditional partnership notions of fidu-
ciary duty provides critical protection for the minority share-
holder of the close corporation. 195 The seminal case for
192 See supra notes 67-71 and accompanying text.
193 See supra notes 49-61 and accompanying text.
194 Like partnerships, a limited liability company may be managed by members
or managers. The limited liability company's operating agreement, like a partnership
agreement, is the critical document governing the conduct of business. See supra note
8 and accompanying text.
195 For an excellent history of the fiduciary duty majority shareholders owe mi-
nority shareholders, see Brent Nicholson, The Fiduciary Duty of Close Corporation
Shareholders: A Call For Legislation, 30/3 AM. Bus. L.J. 513, 515 (1992) (noting that
Southern Pac. Co. v. Bogert, 250 U.S. 483 (1919), is sometimes credited with being
first case to recognize fiduciary duty owed by majority shareholders to minority share-
holders). See also Helms v. Duckworth, 249 F.2d 482, 486-88 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (holding
that close corporation shareholders are like joint venturers or partners in general
partnership, and that majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties of good faith, hon-
esty, and openness to minority shareholders); Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 460
P.2d 464 (Cal. 1969). In Ahmanson, the controlling group of shareholders exchanged
its control block of stock for shares in a holding company which in turn offered its
stock to the public. Id. at 466-69. Minority shareholders were not offered an opportu-
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applying partnership notions of fiduciary duty to the close
corporation to protect minority shareholders is Donahue
v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New England, Inc.'98 In Dona-
nity to exchange their shares. Id. There were relatively few shares of stock in the
active company in which the minority shareholders owned shares, and the price of
each share was so high that they had little market appeal. Id. The holding company,
on the other hand, offered numerous shares at far lower prices. Id. Because of the
ready market for the holding company's shares, the controlling shareholders were
able to sell part of their investment in the active company at a huge profit. Id. at 476.
The court held that the majority shareholders had a duty to offer this same opportu-
nity to minority shareholders. Id. Chief Justice Traynor's opinion describes the rigor-
ous standards of conduct applicable to majority shareholder as follows:
A director is a fiduciary. So is a dominant or controlling stockholder or group
of stockholders .... Their powers are powers in trust .... Their dealings
with the corporation are subjected to rigorous scrutiny and where any of
their contracts or engagements with the corporation is challenged the bur-
den is on the director or stockholder not only to prove the good faith of the
transaction but also to show its inherent fairness from the viewpoint of the
corporation and those interested therein .... The essence of the test is
whether or not under all the circumstances the transaction carries the ear-
marks of an arm's length bargain. If it does not, equity will set it aside.
Id. at 471 (citations omitted); see also Slattery v. Bower, 924 F.2d 6, 10 (1st Cir. 1991)
(where majority breached fiduciary duty by misleading minority as to true worth of
corporation and redeeming minority shareholder's stock at well below its fair value).
196 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975); see Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d
270, 276 (Alaska 1980) (endorsing Donahue but finding it inappropriate to mandate
purchase of minority stock); Tillis v. United Parts, Inc., 395 So. 2d 618, 619 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1981) (following principles established in Donahue, court held that unless
equal opportunity to sell was given to all stockholders, corporations purchase of ma-
jority shares in excess of fair market value constituted preferential distribution of
corporate assets inconsistent with fiduciary duties); Comolli v. Comolli, 246 S.E.2d
278, 281 (Ga. 1978) (endorsing Donahue and requiring corporation to purchase shares
of minority on same terms given to majority); Melish v. Vogel, 343 N.E.2d 17, 26 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1976) (recognizing fiduciary nature of relationship between majority and mi-
nority shareholders but finding insufficient proof of breach of fiduciary duty where
minority shareholder-employee claimed that he developed patent which corporation
owned); Goode v. Ryan, 489 N.E.2d 1001, 1004-05, (Mass. 1986) (refusing to extend
principles of Donahue to require majority shareholders to purchase minority shares
upon death of minority shareholder); Bessette v. Bessette, 434 N.E.2d 206, 208 (Mass.
1982) (providing that minority shareholders should assert claim that majority share-
holder received excessive cash payments from corporation as stockholder's derivative
suit); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 353 N.E.2d 657, 663 (Mass. 1976)
(providing relief to minority shareholder in close corporation whose employment and
income from corporation were terminated without cause by majority shareholders,
but qualifying expansive language regarding fiduciary duties in Donahue); Smith v.
Atlantic Properties, Inc., 422 N.E.2d 798, 801 (Mass. App. 1981) (extending fiduciary
principles enunciated in Donahue to case involving oppression by minority share-
holder of majority); Fought v. Morris, 543 So. 2d 167,170 (Miss. 1989) (invoking stan-
dard of trust and confidence prevailing in partnership relationships where controlling
shareholders failed to comply with terms of stock redemption agreement); Crosby v.
Beam, 548 N.E.2d 217, 221 (Ohio 1989) (holding "[w~here majority or controlling
shareholders in a close corporation breach their heightened fiduciary duty to minority
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hue,1 97 the majority shareholder had authorized the corporation to
repurchase some of his shares.19 The minority shareholder re-
quested that the corporation repurchase her shares on the same
basis as the repurchase of the majority shares, but the majority
shareholder refused. 19 9 The minority successfully litigated to re-
scind the stock repurchase on the grounds that it was a violation
of the majority's fiduciary duties.20 0 The Supreme Court of Mas-
sachusetts observed that the close corporation bears a "striking
resemblance to a partnership"20 1 and held that "stockholders in
the close corporation owe one another substantially the same fidu-
ciary duty in the operation of the enterprise that partners owe to
one another."20 2 This standard was one of "utmost good faith and
loyalty."20 3 Stockholders were prohibited from acting "out of ava-
rice, expediency or self-interest in derogation of their duty of loy-
alty to the other stockholders and to the corporation."20 4
Judicially developed standards, beginning with Meinhard v.
Salmon,20 5 encompass sweeping statements of strict fiduciary
duty.20 8 These broad statements have been criticized for generat-
shareholders by utilizing their majority control of the corporation to their own advan-
tage, without providing minority shareholders with an equal opportunity to benefit,
such breach, absent a legitimate business purpose, is actionable"). The application of
Donahue has been limited in certain cases. See, e.g., Webber Oil Co. v. Murray, 551 A.
2d 1371 (Me. 1988) (refusing to extend fiduciary duty to franchise relationship); see
also Tone v. Baltimore Envelope Co., 498 A.2d 642, 652 (Md. 1985) (refusing to adopt
per se rule requiring corporation to purchase minority shareholders' nonvoting stock
on same conditions as another shareholder); Waite v. Sylvester, 560 A.2d 619, 623
(N.H. 1989) (indicating that removal of partner to resolve schism in management does
not violate fiduciary duty); Zidell v. Zidell, 560 P.2d 1091 (Or. 1977) (refusing to per-
mit plaintiff to prevent another shareholder from consolidating control of
corporation).
Some have criticized the application of partnership principles to protect minority
shareholders. See Nicholson, supra note 195, at 530 (criticizing application of part-
nership analogy because it creates uncertainty); see also Bagdon v. Bridgestone/Fire-
stone, Inc., 916 F.2d 379 (7th Cir. 1990) (criticizing partnership analogy for lack of
predictability and possible inconsistency with party's intent), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
2257 (1991).
197 328 N.E.2d 505 (Mass. 1975).
198 Id. at 510.
199 Id. at 511.
200 Id. at 520-21.
201 Id. at 512.
202 Id. at 515 (citations omitted).
203 Id. (quoting Cardullo v. Landau, 105 N.E.2d 843, 845 (Mass. 1952)).
204 Id.
205 164 N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).
206 See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
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ing significant uncertainty and unpredictability in the law.2" 7 The
more restrained approach embraced by RUPA and by the Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act attempts to curtail sweeping stan-
dards which inject undesired uncertainty in the law.20 At the
same time, this approach retains the duty of loyalty and the con-
tractually based standards of good faith and fair dealing. The ap-
proach is consistent with the hybrid nature of the limited liability
company and provides increased certainty. Nevertheless, a con-
tinuing concern is whether the carefully circumscribed standards
of conduct are comprehensive enough to protect the interests of
minority members and passive investors of limited liability com-
panies. The limitation of the duty of care to gross negligence may
leave members open to the types of abuse which have been wit-
nessed in connection with many syndications of limited"
partnerships. 20 9
D. The Potential Inadequacies of a Purely Contractual Model
Complete deference to the limited liability company's operat-
ing agreement is tantamount to imposing no standard of care or
duty of loyalty upon limited liability company members. In light
of the long-standing history of shareholder dissension in the close
corporation context, and the abuse which has occurred in the con-
text of limited partnerships, judicial intervention will invariably
be needed to mediate disputes among limited liability company
members. Although clothed in a different form, a business enter-
prise operating as a limited liability company will face many of
the same conflicts as its predecessors, whether they previously op-
erated in the form of a close corporation or a limited partnership.
If judicial intervention is indeed inevitable, then legislation
providing a framework for coherent and effective judicial media-
tion of disputes among members of the limited liability company is
clearly desirable.
The standard of good faith and fair dealing is a starting point
for the development of viable standards of conduct for limited lia-
bility company members and managers; however, fiduciary duties
and the good faith and fair dealing standard are distinguish-
able.210 Although contracting parties may seek to advance their
207 See supra notes 85-91 and accompanying text.
208 See supra notes 94-101 and accompanying text.
209 See supra note 101 and accompanying text.
210 See supra notes 122-24 and accompanying text.
1994]
ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
own interests within the parameters of the good faith and fair
dealing standard, their fiduciary duties may not permit the fur-
therance of their own interests.211 Given the long history of ex-
ploitation and the abuse of power which has taken place in the
context of both close corporations and partnerships, the good faith
and reasonable care standard alone is insufficient. However, a
good faith and reasonable care standard, as proposed under the
Uniform Act, may be appropriate when coupled with fiduciary du-
ties to avoid self-interest and competition.212
E. Consistent Treatment of Members and Managers as Agents
Given that members and managers of the limited liability
company are treated as agents in the conduct of business, 213 it
logically follows that the standard of care for members and man-
agers should be determined with reference to the standard appli-
cable to agents. Presumably, agency notions of actual and appar-
ent authority will eventually be applied to limited liability
company managers and members. Managers and members are re-
sponsible for limited liability property as if they were trustees.21 4
To hold managers and members to a lower standard of conduct
than that expected of agents would be inconsistent with the statu-
tory and judicial treatment of members and managers as agents.
F. The Need to Combat Oppression of the Majority by the
Minority
A due care standard imposed upon members may also assist
in combating the prospect of oppressive behavior by minority
members of limited liability companies. The landmark case illus-
trating the power of the minority to tyrannize the majority is
Smith v. Atlantic Properties, Inc. 215 In Smith, a minority share-
holder continually exercised his veto power to block distributions
of dividends to shareholders of a closely held corporation. As a
result, the corporation incurred tax penalties for accumulating
earnings in excess of the business's reasonable needs.216 The
211 See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
212 See supra notes 163-80 and accompanying text (discussing Proposed Uniform
Limited Liability Company Act).
213 See supra notes 126-32 and accompanying text.
214 See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
215 422 N.E.2d 798 (Mass. App. Ct. 1981).
216 Id. at 800.
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court ultimately gave injunctive relief to the majority share-
holders.2 17
A standard of due care applicable to all members would foster
the reciprocal responsibility owed by majority and minority mem-
bers toward each other.218
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
A. A Blended Approach Tailored to the Hybrid Nature of the
Limited Liability Company
A blended approach which recognizes agency, partnership,
and contractual principles is perhaps best suited to the hybrid na-
ture of the limited liability company. At present, the Discussion
Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act comes closest
to integrating all three models. It imposes the contractual stan-
dard of good faith and fair dealing, which may not be elimi-
nated.219 It also retains duties of loyalty, including a duty to ac-
count for property or profit without consent of the members, a
duty to refrain from dealing with or on behalf of a party having an
adverse interest without the consent of other members, and a
prohibition against competition without the consent of the
members.22 0
While it is commendable that the Discussion Draft adopts
specific duties of loyalty and the standard of good faith and fair
dealing, the adoption of a gross negligence standard rather than
an ordinary negligence standard is more controversial. The gross
negligence standard stands in striking contrast to the require-
ments contained in existing limited liability company statutes
217 Id. at 803.
218 See Donahue, 328 N.E.2d at 515 n.17 (recognizing that minority may do dam-
age to majority's interest).
219 See supra note 178 and accompanying text. But see Coffee, supra note 37, at
1665 (recommending nonwaivable standard of good faith and fair dealing in corporate
law). Professor Coffee recommended that:
(1) the contractual provision [permitting a waiver] may not reduce the fidu-
ciary's obligations below the level that the duty of good faith would require;
(2) the provision must not conflict with the "plain meaning" of any statute;
(3) it must have sufficient specificity to permit the parties to "price" the dif-
ference between the provision and the normally applicable legal rule; (4) if
the provision substitutes a remedy, it must amount to an adequate substi-
tute, rather than simply a waiver; and (5) in the case of a charter amend-
ment, the provision must receive disinterested shareholder approval under
circumstances that were not coercive.
Id.
220 See supra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
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that impose a standard of due care.221 RUPA's adoption of the
same language employing the gross negligence standard gener-
ated considerable debate.222 Proponents defend the gross negli-
gence standard by arguing that investors in a partnership would
be likely to share losses caused by each other's ordinary negli-
gence in a manner consistent with their overall loss-sharing ra-
tio.2 2 3 Donald J. Weidner, the Reporter for RUPA, observed that:
[T]he Drafting Committee has attempted to craft default rules
that are efficient and fair. The basic idea is that default rules
should reflect what most partners would regard as implicit in
their partnership agreements .... It is not clear what duty of
care rule would be included in most partnership agreements if
the matter were addressed. To the extent partners know that
they vary in ability or attitude toward care, they are likely to
contract. Their contracting may not take the form of an altered
loss-sharing ratio. Rather, their contracting may take the form
of assigning low-risk functions to high-risk partners. On the
other hand, contracting for care may be far less likely when part-
ners either know little about each other or assume they are
equally skillful and careful. If they believe that negligent inju-
ries are an inevitable series of costs that over time will be im-
posed randomly and equally by all partners, a contract to share
losses seems a likely outcome. In such a situation, an agreement
to share losses primarily affects the timing of a partner's loss, not
the amount of her loss. The agreement to share losses in effect
allows each partner to amortize the losses she incurs .... An
assumption of equality, therefore, may explain the opinion of
those who believe that partners tacitly agree to share the losses
caused by each other's ordinary negligence. If one assumes
equality, it seems likely that the partners as a group would agree
either to self-insure or to purchase third party insurance. This
suggests that there should not be a special default rule for the
losses caused by the negligence of a partner. Stated differently,
as among the partners, there should be no duty of care rule to
specially allocate losses to the partners who negligently cause
them.2 2
4
However, a situation in which an assumption of equality may
not always apply in the limited liability company context is in
family business arrangements. In second generation businesses,
221 See supra notes 141-47.
222 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 468; see also Beveridge, supra note 21.
223 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 468.
224 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 468.
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children may join parents or relatives in a business enterprise.
Minority interests may be inherited, and the business may be op-
erated by a variety of relatives or acquaintances over a considera-
ble period of time. The original bargain may indeed be personal
and equal with respect to those parties who initially formed the
limited liability company, but an assumption of equality may not
be appropriate when there are minority members or members who
do not actively participate in management.225
Another argument which has been advanced in support of a
gross negligence standard for partnerships, rather than the more
exacting ordinary negligence standard, focuses on the factor of
personal liability in partnerships. A noted authority has
observed:
The difference between a partner, and a paid agent is, of course,
that the partner is subject to individual liability for partnership
debts, so that legal liability is less necessary to encourage the
agent to act carefully. Because of this individual liability, per-
haps a partner should also be distinguished from a corporate
director.226
Since the limited liability company shields members from per-
sonal liability, the incentive to aspire to careful conduct is absent.
225 See Bahls, supra note 187, at 326. This issue of whether reasonable expecta-
tions can be imputed to minority shareholders who have obtained their rights in a
close corporation without bargaining for them has been discussed at length. Id. Bahls
notes:
In cases in which shareholders obtain their shares without bargaining
with the majority shareholders of the corporation, courts have refused to at-
tribute the reasonable expectation of the transferor to the transferee. The
intent of original shareholders to operate the business is usually personal in
nature. An expectation that one will participate in management of the busi-
ness does not necessarily mean that one's son, daughter, ex-spouse, or other
transferee will have the same opportunity. In these cases, courts should ap-
ply the standard of fair dealing or fiduciary duty when evaluating the con-
duct of others. As a result, the court should apply the remedy most likely to
stop the unfair conduct or breach of fiduciary duty.
Id. (citations omitted); see also O'Neal, supra note 17, at 883. O'Neal observes:
A person taking a minority position in a close corporation often leaves
himself vulnerable to squeeze-out or oppression by failing to insist upon a
shareholders' agreement or appropriate charter or bylaw provisions, even if
the corporation is domiciled in a jurisdiction with laws favorable to such pro-
tective arrangements. He may be unaware of the risks involved, or his bar-
gaining position may be so weak that he is unable to negotiate for protection.
Further, he may have been given or may have inherited his minority
interest.
Id.
226 See BROMBERG & RmsTErN, supra note 72, at 6:86.
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Thus, if the rationale to support the gross negligence standard in
the partnership context rests on the existence of personal liability,
such a rationale has no application in the case of the limited liabil-
ity company.
In the case of partnerships, it has been forcefully argued that
the standard of care among partners should reflect the legitimate
expectations of the parties.227 Professor Norwood P. Beveridge,
Jr., member of the American Bar Association Committee on Part-
nerships and Unincorporated Business Organizations and the
Subcommittee on the Revised Uniform Partnership Act, argues
that one's legitimate expectations are that co-partners will exer-
cise ordinary care-the care that employees are expected to exer-
cise under agency principles.2 2 s Professor Beveridge observes:
[S]ince the provisions of the Uniform Partnership Act are de-
fault provisions which apply in the absence of a contrary agree-
ment, they should reflect legitimate expectations of the parties.
It is not likely that a partner, to the extent that he considers the
question, would expect his co-partners to be held to a lower stan-
dard of care than employees of the partnership. If anything, the
contrary would be true. A partner would naturally expect a co-
partner to indemnify the partnership for loss caused by that
partner's negligence and gross error of judgment before he would
expect the same of an employee.229
It is suggested that the reasonable expectations of members of
a privately held business enterprise, whether operated in the form
of a partnership, a close corporation, or a limited liability company
are that other members will indeed exercise due care. Further,
given the lack of personal liability in a limited liability company,
it may be argued that the more socially responsible legal standard
of care for members and managers is ordinary negligence. Partic-
ularly in business enterprises affecting the environment or more
directly, the welfare and safety of the community, the ordinary
care standard may be preferable from a public policy standpoint.
Further, there may be a need for the more stringent standard of
ordinary care in the context of family businesses in which abuse
has historically occurred and is likely to continue, despite a
change in the legal entity selected.
227 See Beveridge, supra note 21, at 765.
228 See Beveridge, supra note 21, at 765-66.
229 See Bahls, supra note 187, at 462.
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Finally, the due care standard is consistent with the overall
role of members and managers as agents of the limited liability
company. A standard of care which departs from the agent's stan-
dard of due care may create inconsistencies in the responsibilities
and duties of members and managers alike.
For the foregoing reasons, it is appropriate to assign a stan-
dard of conduct that is derived from agency principles under
which due care is required.230 The due care standard is consistent
with the concept that members and managers of a limited liability
company act as agents for the enterprise. Further, it is an ap-
proach which has already been embraced by a number of states.2 3 '
B. The Role of the Judiciary
In the interest of providing certainty and predictability, lim-
ited liability company legislation should provide limitations to the
duty of loyalty to prevent unbridled discretion by the judiciary.
This approach is best illustrated by the Discussion Draft of the
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, which limits the duty of
loyalty to specified categories of conduct.232 Nevertheless, the im-
portance of the judiciary in preventing abusive and oppressive
conduct by members and managers should not be overlooked.
Judicial activism in interpreting the standard of care, the
duty of loyalty and the standard of good faith and fair dealing has
been criticized in both the partnership and corporate arenas.2 33 It
230 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
231 See supra notes 149-51.
232 See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
233 See Weidner, supra note 72, at 462. The author states:
RUPA section 21(b) [regarding the statement that the duty of loyalty is lim-
ited to three rules] appears to have been motivated in part by a sense that
vague, broad statements of a powerful duty of loyalty cause too much uncer-
tainty. It was suggested that, even if there are no bad holdings, overly broad
judicial language has left practitioners uncertain about whether their nego-
tiated agreements will be voided. It was said that attorneys and their clients
want to be able to negotiate transactions, reduce their agreements to writ-
ing, and have some comfort that those agreements will not be undone by
"fuzzy" notions of fiduciary duties.
Id. The concern about inconsistencies and uncertainties in judicial decisions regard-
ing standards of conduct in the corporate context is also reflected by the enactment of
a flood of proposed legislation aimed at giving directors of corporations relief from
liability for breach of the duty of care. See Gelb, supra note 37, at 23.
Although the factors referred to above may have caused some concern
about service on a board of directors, several recent developments produced
particularly deep anxieties. One of the most traumatic of the developments
was the result in a case previously alluded to, Smith v. Van Gorkom, which
19941
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may be argued that judicial intrusiveness in business decisions
injects undesirable uncertainty. In an effort to circumscribe judi-
cial action, RUPA, on which the Discussion Draft relies, limits the
type of conduct which may violate the duty of loyalty.234 In the
corporate arena, the American Law Institute has recommended a
statutory formulation of the business judgment rule, noting:
Confusion with respect to the business judgment rule has been
created by the numerous varying formulations of the rule and
the fact that courts have often stated the rule incompletely or
with elliptical shorthand references. The relatively precise for-
mulation of the business judgment rule set forth in Section
4.01(c) avoids confusion.235
The provision for viable statutory remedies for members is
critical in developing predictable laws which will afford members
protection from personal liability. Provisions for shareholders de-
rivative actions23 6 and for some equivalent of appraisal or dis-
senter's rights237 should be considered. Actions for involuntary
judicial dissolution on the basis of fraud, illegal conduct, or op-
pressive conduct are yet another statutory approach which may be
useful in handling member dissension.238
It is hoped that statutory language will be developed which
provides meaningful, practical guidance to practitioners and to
the courts. Although certainty in the law is clearly important, the
generated severe reactions in some quarters. In Van Gorkom, which in-
volved large damages, directors were found personally liable for gross negli-
gence because they did not inform themselves adequately regarding a
merger transaction.
Id. (citation omitted).
234 See UNIF. LIMITED LABILITY COMPANY ACT § 408 (Discussion Draft 1993).
235 ALI, supra note 38, at 173.
236 See, e.g., Ca. S.B. 469, 1993-94 Reg. Sess. (providing for shareholder's deriva-
tive action made in Chapter 11).
237 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322B.383 (West Supp. 1994) (giving dissenter's rights
to members of limited liability company); see also MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT ANN.
§ 13.01, commentary on historical background, at 1359 (indicating that Model Busi-
ness Corporation Act requires corporation to buy shares of shareholders who object to
identified, extraordinary corporate transactions). The statutory comparison as of No-
vember 25, 1991 indicates that 24 jurisdictions have definition provisions similar to
the Model Act, including: Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Iowa,
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Vir-
ginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Eight additional jurisdictions include
special definition and terms, including: California, Connecticut, Florida, Kansas,
Maryland, New Jersey, and Ohio. Id. at 1362.
238 See MODEL CLOSE CORP. Supp. § 40, at 1850-51 (1984).
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role of the judiciary must not be underestimated in cases involving
privately held business enterprises, which have a long history of
shareholder dissension and abusive and oppressive conduct.
239
The role of the judiciary will become critical in interpreting the
meaning of statutory standards of conduct of limited liability com-
pany members and managers. In connection with the movement
away from mandatory corporate standards of conduct, Professor
John C. Coffee, Jr. has observed the increasingly important role of
the judiciary as more flexible, contractually based corporate laws
have evolved.24 ° Professor Coffee notes:
A historical perspective frames the issue similarly. Even the
most casual observation reveals that the fiduciary strictures of
American corporate law-presumably, corporate law's most
mandatory inner core-have changed dramatically over this cen-
tury. In truth, corporate law has been in flux throughout Ameri-
can history, and the fact that the supposedly mandatory core of
corporate law has shrunk significantly presents a problem for
those who wish to justify its nonwaivable status. If it has
changed in the past, why should it remain static in the future?
... Who then is right-the contractarians or their critics? This
Article answers that both are right and both are wrong, because
both have misstated the problem. In this Article's view, contrac-
tual innovation can be reconciled with a stable mandatory core of
corporate law if we recognize that what is most mandatory in
corporate law is not the specific substantive content of any rule,
but rather the institution of judicial oversight. Judicial activism
is the necessary complement to contractual freedom. In short,
because such long-term relational contracting is necessarily in-
complete, the court's role becomes that of preventing one party
from exercising powers delegated to it for the mutual benefit of
all shareholders for purely self-interested ends. Indeed, that
courts will at some point intervene is intuitively understood by
the bar. In drafting the corporate contract, lawyers rely less on
the model form provided by the legislature than on their expecta-
tion that courts will prevent either side from taking "opportunis-
tic" advantage of the other.241
Professor Coffee's observation has equal application to the limited
liability company.
239 See supra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
240 Coffee, supra note 37, at 1620-21.
241 Coffee, supra note 37, at 1620-21 (citations omitted).
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C. The Importance of Dissenters' Rights and Other Statutory
Remedies
One method of curtailing judicial discretion to fashion reme-
dies for minority oppression and other misconduct is to provide
meaningful statutory remedies. Some states already provide
members of limited liability companies with a right to a derivative
stockholders action.242 Other states provide for dissenters'
rights.24 3 Still others provide for involuntary dissolution in the
event of fraudulent or illegal conduct or an abuse of power that is
contrary to public policy.244 These types of statutory remedies are
recommended as a means of avoiding expansive judicial remedies
which could inject undesirable uncertainty in the law.245
The award of dissenters' rights gives members the option of
obtaining the fair market value of the member's interest upon the
occurrence of a specified event. Dissenters' rights provide a viable
solution to the problem of illiquidity of the member's interest. The
illiquidity of one's investment in a privately held enterprise has
long been cited as a significant factor contributing to minority
oppression.246
CONCLUSION
An approach which integrates agency, partnership, and con-
tractual standards should be employed to regulate the conduct of
members and managers of limited liability companies. A blend of
these standards acknowledges the hybrid nature of the limited lia-
bility company and recognizes that limited liability companies are
privately owned enterprises which are likely to be used by family
businesses. Selected standards of conduct should have utility in
resolving dissension in the context of such businesses. In this re-
gard, the history of close corporation law and of relations between
general and limited partners engaged in joint ventures is instruc-
242 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CORPS. & ASS'NS § 4A-801-804 (1993) (providing
members with right to derivative action).
243 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 322.383 (West Supp. 1994); see also W. VA. CODE
§ 31-1A-46 (1993).
244 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.448 (West Supp. 1994).
245 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
246 See Bahls, supra note 187, at 288-89. 'In close corporations, the dominant
shareholders usually double as managers, while in publicly held corporations the
managers usually own a relatively small percentage of stock. Minority shareholders
in a close corporation, however, face a unique set of problems because they have no
ready market for their stock." Id. (citations omitted).
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tive. The Discussion Draft of the Uniform Limited Liability Com-
pany Act integrates agency, partnership, and contractual models,
and is well suited to the hybrid nature of the limited liability com-
pany. However, consistent with the notion that limited liability
company members function as agents of the enterprise, the agency
concept of due care should be adopted. To employ a lower stan-
dard would place members in the dubious position of requiring
from ordinary employees a higher standard of care than from their
closest business associates or managers. Statutory remedies, such
as dissenters' rights, stockholder derivative actions, and involun-
tary dissolution remedies, should also be considered to prevent the
fashioning of broad and uncertain judicial remedies.

